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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates the impact on power system performance of uncertainty
arising from physical and cyber components of power systems. If the impact
of the uncertainty arising from emerging technologies is not fully understood,
it will likely lead to the deployment of unreliable and unsafe systems, which
could have catastrophic consequences. In this thesis, we first identify sources
of uncertainty, and their impact on both system dynamic security and relia-
bility. Then, we recognize the gaps that have not been studied in the existing
related work, and develop models and methods to fill the gaps.
We mainly focus on the evaluation of uncertainty impact in two applica-
tions: (i) the impact of measurement uncertainty on power system dynamic
performance (at the transmission level), and (ii) the impact of uncertain
phenomena on power systems coordinating demand response resources (at
distribution level). With respect to the first application, we focus on the
impact of both measurement errors and delays on the dynamic performance
of power systems with automatic generation control (AGC). A framework
to model the deterministic and random measurement errors, and measure-
ment delays, as well as the corresponding analysis methods, are developed.
Along the process, the different time scales of the system dynamics, as well
as the discrete nature of the sampling process in AGC, should be considered.
Eventually, with the developed framework, we can determine system stability
under various measurement uncertainty scenarios. In the second application,
we have developed a stochastic hybrid system (SHS) model that can capture
both continuous dynamics and discrete events that arise from random fail-
ures and repairs. A reliability measure is also proposed and evaluated. In
order to illustrate and validate the proposed evaluation methods proposed
in this thesis, the results of all proposed analytical methods addressing the
random factors are compared with those obtained by Monte Carlo methods
via examples and case studies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we introduce the motivation for this thesis, i.e., the need
to evaluate the impact on system performance of uncertainty arising from
physical and cyber components of power systems. To put the work in context,
we provide some background and review existing work related to each topic
addressed in the thesis. Finally, we present the thesis contributions and
organization.
1.1 Motivation and Background
Current power systems are undergoing radical transformations toward en-
suring more reliable, environmentally friendly, and economical operations.
Emerging technologies, such as renewable-based electricity generation, ad-
vanced cyber communication infrastructure, and demand response resources
(DRRs), introduce new sources of uncertainty, posing new challenges in the
operations and performance of power systems. In this thesis, we aim at in-
vestigating the uncertainty impact on power system performance; and after
identifying the research gaps, we focus on the impact of cyber-physical un-
certainty on power system dynamic performance and the impact of uncertain
phenomena on systems coordinating DRRs.
Cyber-Physical Uncertainty Impact. Specialized communication net-
work and protocols in the power system have received considerable attention
in the context of the smart grid vision. Supervisory control and data acqui-
sition (SCADA) systems, as computer-controlled systems, have been widely
utilized in power systems for monitoring, control and protection. The Dis-
tributed Network Protocol (DNP3) is the communication protocol used in
SCADA systems; the specifics of DNP3 for SCADA systems in electric power
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networks can be found in [1]. However, due to the lack of authentication ca-
pabilities in SCADA communication protocols, it is possible for adversaries
to manipulate sensor measurements, inject false control commands, develop
denial of service attacks, and resort to other malicious actions [2]. Various
false data detection techniques based on state estimation (SE) have been de-
veloped and can be used to identify the sensor measurement manipulations
[3]. However, false date injection attacks against state estimation [4, 5] have
also been widely investigated by researchers. Moreover, as one of the inputs
to the automatic generation control (AGC) system, the integrity of frequency
measurements is difficult to assure, due to the fact that steady-state opera-
tion is assumed in state estimation and frequency variable is not included in
SE.
Furthermore, with the urge to enhance system situational awareness, as
well as the availability of advanced measurement technologies, a wide area
measurement system (WAMS) has been under rapid development. This sys-
tem will facilitate the understanding and management of the increasingly
complex behavior exhibited by large power systems. The advanced mea-
surement devices in WAMS, called synchronized phasor measurement units
(PMUs), can measure both phase magnitudes and angles at high sampling
rates. In 2019, more than 1000 PMUs will be installed in North America,
covering all 200 kV and above voltages substations, and even part of the
distribution network [6]. A protocol for synchrophasor measurement com-
munication used in WAMS was defined in an IEEE standard in 1995, and
revised as IEEE Standard C37.118 in 2005 [7]. However, the literature has
demonstrated the feasibility of manipulating the measurements by spoofing
synchronized clocks embedded in PMUs [8].
Also, both DNP3 and the synchrophasor measurement communication pro-
tocol mainly specify the application layer structures, and suggest Ethernet
with the user datagram protocol (UDP) or transmission control protocol
(TCP)/Internet protocol (IP) as lower layers of the communication network
partially due to its dominance in the marketplace. However, since TCP/IP
is not specifically designed for networked control systems, the measurement
delays are not fixed, and even random. Apart from malicious manipulations
to measurements and random delays, noise in the communication channel,
as another contributor to measurement uncertainty, cannot be avoided.
In terms of the impact, we focus on the automatic generation control sys-
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tems. As the only system-level automatic closed-loop control system over
the information technology (IT) infrastructure of a power system [9], AGC is
sensitive to measurement uncertainty, which, in turn, could cause immediate
influence on power system performance. The AGC system takes measure-
ments of the power system frequency, the real power interchange between
balancing authority (BA) areas, and the generation power profile of units
online as inputs, and sends out control signals as outputs to the generators
through the IT infrastructure.
In terms of the AGC simulation, we have noted that although AGC has
been widely implemented in modern power systems for decades to make
the system function properly, primarily to maintain the system nominal fre-
quency, there has been considerable interest in re-examining the AGC sys-
tem, especially with various techniques emerging in power system operations.
Traditionally, it has been assumed that the time scale of AGC is larger than
that of other power system components, e.g., generator rotors, exciters, and
governors. Therefore, the dynamics of the AGC system and other system
components are decoupled. AGC is usually not included in conventional sys-
tem dynamic analysis and simulations. Also, for AGC studies, the responses
of other system components are assumed to settle out fast enough to be
modeled as a set of algebraic equations rather than dynamic models [10].
However, this assumption is not entirely true due to the large-inertia plants
in the power systems. Moreover, in the new-generation power grid, vari-
ous emerging techniques challenge the performance and operations of AGC.
For instance, the increasingly deep penetration of renewable-based genera-
tion introduces high variability into the system, which may potentially drive
the current AGC system to fail to meet the performance requirements. In
addition, new types of resources in the ancillary service market (e.g., batter-
ies, and thermostatically controlled load participating as demand response
resources), which although can alleviate the side effect caused by the inter-
mittence of renewable energies, also bring up new questions to AGC system
design. For instance, the AGC command signals to battery-type participants
must be properly designed to be neutral over a certain period. And the fast
response ability of these resources incentivize the AGC system to operate in
a faster manner (at least to send command signals to these resources more
frequently), so as to improve the system performance. Therefore, for both
power system performance analysis and AGC algorithm design, the AGC
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dynamics cannot be isolated with the dynamics of other system components
(e.g., generators and loads) any more. System dynamic simulations that
include a comprehensive model are necessary.
Uncertainty Impact on Demand Response Resources. Another re-
cent trend is the development of schemes in which demand resources respond
to operator signals. In such demand response programs, consumers are able
to adjust their consumption accordingly when the grid supply-demand mis-
match is severe, or grid reliability is in jeopardy; these consumers are referred
to as demand response resources (DRRs) [11]. Common examples of DRRs
include residential and commercial loads with the ability to store thermal
energy (e.g., residential thermostatically controlled loads, and commercial
building HVAC systems), and other interruptible loads (e.g., certain indus-
trial consumers). Typically, in order for these DRRs to participate in a
demand response program, an aggregator that coordinates their response
and bids into the wholesale market is required; in this thesis, we refer to a
collection of DRR units coordinated by an aggregator as a DRR aggregation
system.
The use of DRRs has been promoted by several initiatives. For example,
Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) Order No. 719 defines the
role of the aggregator as an entity that can bid on behalf of aggregated loads
in various electricity markets, e.g., capacity, energy, and ancillary service
markets [12]. In 2014, DRRs contributed up to 10% of the peak demand
in the footprint of some independent system operators (ISOs) [13], and in
2011, DRRs played a significant role and helped avoiding power outages
during peak summer load periods in the footprint of the Electric Reliability
Council of Texas (ERCOT) [13]. However, there are remaining issues related
to uncertainty that are hampering the widespread deployment of DRRs.
One such issue is reliability; a participant in a DRR aggregation system
may fail to respond to the command sent by the aggregator due to various
reasons. For example, while the advanced metering infrastructure facilitates
the implementation of demand response programs, high dependence on such
infrastructure introduces the possibility of malicious cyber attacks, and de-
vice misbehavior. Moreover, the customer may opt out at any time as par-
ticipation is mostly on a voluntary basis (see, e.g., the SmartAC program
implemented by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company [4]). As the reliance
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on DRRs increases, the impact of such events is no longer negligible. Thus, it
is necessary to carefully perform reliability evaluation and assess the actual
capacity of DRR aggregation systems. In this regard, power grid reliability
may be significantly threatened if the expected capacity of DRR aggrega-
tion systems is not realized when needed, especially considering the fact that
DRRs are usually utilized when the system is stressed. Also, the aggregator
may face significant fines.
1.2 Preliminaries
Uncertainties in power systems can be classified into two types: aleatory and
epistemic uncertainties [14, 15, 16]. Aleatory uncertainty is also termed as
objective, and inherent uncertainty. The sources of this type of uncertainty
include:
• random failures and repairs of both physical and cyber equipment
• load variation
• renewable generation resources that are difficult to predict
• demand response resources (DRRs) in which individual participant be-
havior may be unpredictable
• uncertainty in economics and policies such as the fuel and energy prices,
and market rule reformation
According to [15, 17], epistemic uncertainty, also termed as subjective uncer-
tainty, is the difference between measured, estimated values and true values,
resulting from an incomplete or inaccurate scientific understanding of the
underlying behavior of some process. It lies in the following:
• parameters in the models describing the system static and dynamic
behavior and uncertain factors
• measurements used in power system monitoring, control, and opera-
tions, the errors of which arise from, e.g., measuring device malfunc-
tions and malicious cyber attacks
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The impact of uncertainties is vast, mainly including the impact on the
following two systems [18, 19]:
• system reliability
• system operational security and stability
Many studies focus on system reliability analysis, which is critical for system
planning. For instance, the impacts of random failure events and uncertain
renewable resources on system adequacy have been well studied (see, e.g.,
[20]). There is an increasing number of studies addressing the impact on
system operational security and stability performance [19]. For instance,
[21] studies the impact of renewable resources on system dynamics; and the
authors in [22] studied the impact of load model parameter uncertainty on
system dynamic performance. However, essentially, each uncertain factor as
listed above may have both impacts on system reliability and stability. There
are still aspects not studied, especially with new sources of uncertainty intro-
duced by the close coupling of cyber and physical layers in power systems.
In this thesis, we aim at filling the gaps and focus on investigating the im-
pact of measurement uncertainty on system stability, as well as the impact
of uncertain behavior on the reliability measures of systems coordinating a
large number of DDRs.
In order to evaluate the impact of uncertainty, the deterministic system
model is transformed into a stochastic model by introducing the uncertain
factors, which are described by stochastic processes [17]. Then, the Monte
Carlo simulation method (see, e.g., [18] and [23]) can be used to evaluate
statistical measures of interest. However, these methods are usually very
time consuming, which limits their applications. Then, analytical methods
are investigated for computationally efficiency. If the uncertain factors are
modeled by continuous random variables, the probability distributions of the
system performance variables can be obtained by propagating probability
distribution [24]. If the uncertain factor is modeled as a discrete event, such as
a Poisson process, Markov chain models can be developed; and corresponding
analysis methods can be applied (see, e.g., [20] and [25]). Common examples
are the reliability analysis considering component failures. However, if the
system involves both continuous dynamics and discrete stochastic processes,
we need to develop a generalized model called the stochastic hybrid system
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(SHS) model, which will be used in this thesis. Thus, in the remaining of this
section, we first describe the deterministic power system model used in this
thesis—a power dynamic model with automatic generation control as well as
the SHS model description and analysis method. (As the DRR coordination
structure is not universally identified, we will propose the deterministic DRR
coordination model used in our studies in Chapter 5.)
1.2.1 Power System with Automatic Generation Control
As part of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system,
the AGC algorithms are implemented in a centralized location (typically a
control center). AGC is critical for power systems to (i) regulate frequency,
and (ii) keep the interchange power between balancing authority (BA) areas
at the scheduled values. To achieve these goals, the AGC system takes mea-
surements of: (i) the area frequency, (ii) the generation output of committed
units, and (iii) the interchange of power between BA areas; calculates the
so-called area control error (ACE); and determines the generator set point
values so as to drive the ACE to zero. These measurements acquired at
various points of the physical power system network are transmitted to the
control center over a cyber network. It is obvious then that measurement
data quality is critical to system performance in the sense that measurement
errors (e.g., false data injection over the communication channels) may mis-
lead the calculation involved in the AGC algorithms and severely affect the
overall system performance. The modeling framework adopted in this the-
sis, which includes the standard power system electromechanical dynamics
model, and the AGC system model, is presented here.
1.2.1.1 Power System Electromechanical Dynamics Model
We describe the electromechanical behavior of a power system by a set of
differential algebraic equations (DAEs) of the form (see, e.g., [26], [27]):
x˙ = f(x, y, u), (1.1a)
0 = g(x, y, p), (1.1b)
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where x(t) ∈ Rn contains the dynamic states of synchronous generators;
y(t) ∈ Rm denotes the system algebraic states, including bus voltage magni-
tudes and angles; p(t) ∈ Ro denotes the vector of active power loads at time
t; u(t) ∈ Rl includes the generator set points; f : Rn+m+l 7→ Rn describes the
evolution of the dynamics states; and g : Rn+m+o 7→ Rm describes the power
flow equations.
1.2.1.2 Automatic Generation Control Model
The governor set points u, in (1.1a), are determined by the AGC. Let Pmeasaa′ (t)
denote the measured interchange power from area a to a neighboring area a′
at time t, P schaa′ (t) denote the scheduled value, fmeasa (t) denote the measured
area frequency, and fnorm denote the nominal system frequency. LetA denote
the set of all BA areas in the interconnected power system. Then, the ACE
of each area a ∈ A is defined as
ACEa(t) =
∑
a′∈Aa
(Pmeasaa′ (t)− P schaa′ (t)) + βa(fmeasa (t)− fnorm),∀a ∈ A, (1.2)
where βa is the bias factor, and Aa denotes the set of BA areas that are
connected to area a through tie lines.
In this thesis, we adopt the AGC control logic described in [28]. To this
end, we define a state variable, za(t), for each area a ∈ A, which is the sum
of the set point values of participating generators in area a. The evolution
of za(t) is then described by
z˙a(t) = −za(t)− ACEa(t) +
∑
i∈Ga
PmeasGi (t), (1.3)
where Ga is the set of generators in area a that participate in AGC, and
PmeasGi (t) is the measured power output of generator i in Ga at time t. For
each generator i ∈ Ga, the set point P refi (t) is proportional to za(t), i.e.,
P refi (t) = κaiza(t), where the κai ’s satisfy
∑
i∈Ga κai = 1.
Then, as defined in Section 1.2.1.1, the set points form u(t), i.e.,
u(t) = {P refi (t)}i∈Ga,a∈A ∈ Rl.
By stacking the AGC state variables, we form z(t) = {za(t)}a∈A ∈ Rp. Let
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γmeas(t) denote the set of all measurement variables as
γmeas(t) := {fmeasa (t), PmeasGi (t), Pmeasaa′ (t)}a∈A,a′∈Aa ∈ Rq,
and i ∈ Ga. Then, the AGC system can be described compactly as follows:
z˙ = h1(γ
meas, z), (1.4a)
u = k(z), (1.4b)
with h1 : Rp+q 7→ Rp and k : Rp 7→ Rl.
1.2.2 Stochastic Hybrid Systems
The state space of an SHS is comprised of a discrete state space, and a con-
tinuous state space. We refer to the pair formed by these two as the combined
state space of the SHS. The transitions among the discrete states are random,
and the rates at which these transitions occur are allowed to be a function
of time and the continuous state. For any fixed value of the discrete state,
the evolution of the continuous state is described by a stochastic differential
equation (SDE). Moreover, whenever the discrete state changes, the continu-
ous state is allowed to change discontinuously, and there is a reset map that
defines the relation between pre- and post-transition states.
A full understanding of an SHS would include obtaining the distribution
of the combined state as a function of time; however, this is an intractable
problem in general. In fact, this problem is solvable in only a few spe-
cial cases. For instance, if the transitions among discrete states is indepen-
dent of the continuous state, the evolution of the former is described by a
continuous-time Markov chain, the solution of which is fully characterized by
the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations. However, if these transitions depend
on the continuous state, it is typically impossible to write down an exact
distribution; thus, here we settle for a method that allows the computation
of any arbitrary number of its moments, as in [29]. To this end, we utilize
the generator of the stochastic process and Dynkin’s formula to obtain a dif-
ferential equation describing the evolution of the expectation of any function
of the combined state. (This is possible as long as such a function is in the
domain of the extended generator [29, 30].)
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1.2.2.1 SHS Definition
Let Q be a countable set of discrete states and P a continuous state space.
The general idea of an SHS is that in each small time interval dt, the system
jumps from discrete state q to discrete state q′ with probability λq,q′(x, t)dt;
when this jump occurs, the continuous state is reset to φq,q′(x, t). If the
system does not jump, then it stays in state q, and x evolves according to a
stochastic differential equation (SDE) associated to the discrete state q. The
precise definition is given next.
Definition 1. A stochastic hybrid system (SHS) is a quintuple (Q,P ,Λ,Φ,F)
where
• Q is a countable set of discrete states.
• P is the continuous state space with d dimensions, typically taken to
be Rd.
• Λ = (λq,q′)q,q′∈Q is a collection of transition rate functions λq,q′(x, t)
with λq,q′ : P × [0,∞)→ R+.
• Φ = (φq,q′)q,q′∈Q is a collection of reset maps x 7→ φq,q′(x, t) with φq,q′ :
P × [0,∞)→ P .
• F is a collection of stochastic differential equations, describing the dy-
namics of continuous state x ∈ P in any discrete state q ∈ Q, as
d
dt
x(t) = fq(x, t) + gq(x, t)w˙,
where w is a vector of independent Brownian motion processes.
For the purposes of this thesis, we will assume the state dynamic evolution
in each discrete state is governed by ODEs, i.e., gq(x, t) = 0. Moreover, we
assume that the system is stationary, i.e., fq, λq,q′ , and φq,q′ do not depend
explicitly on time.
1.2.2.2 Generator and Moment Flow Equation
Let ψ : Q×P → R be bounded and continuously differentiable with respect
to its second argument (we will call such a function an observable or test
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function). Define Lψ by
Lψ(q, x) := lim
→0
E[ψ(Qt+, Xt+)|Qt = q,Xt = x]− ψ(q, x)

.
It is not hard to see that L is then a linear operator on the space of observ-
ables, from where we can obtain the formula commonly known as Dynkin’s
formula:
d
dt
E[ψ(Qt, Xt)] = E[Lψ(Qt, Xt)]. (1.5)
We can then extend the domain of definition of L to include all ψ such
that (1.5) holds, and one can show that, under mild conditions on Λ, Φ, and
F , this extended domain contains all polynomials and indicator functions
(see [31] for details).
For the SHS defined above, we can explicitly compute
Lψ(q, x) =fq(x) · ∇xψ(q, x)
+
∑
q′∈Q
λq,q′(x)(ψ(q
′, φq,q′(x))− ψ(q, x)).
We see that if fq, λq,q′ , and φq,q′ are polynomials in x, then L maps polyno-
mials to polynomials. Moreover, we can show that for polynomial SHSs, by
properly choosing the test functions, the extended generator together with
Dynkin’s formula provides a set of ODEs, which describe the evolution of
conditional moments of interest. For the case when d = 1, i.e., x(t) ∈ R, we
define the following family of test functions:
ψ
(m)
i (q, x) := δi(q)x
m =
xm, q = i0, q 6= i ,∀i ∈ Q.
The expectation of these test functions, denoted by µ(m)i (t), are the product
of conditional moments and occupational probabilities, i.e.,
µ
(m)
i (t) : = E[ψ
(m)
i (Q(t), X(t))]
= E[Xm(t)|Q(t) = i]Pr{Q(t) = i}.
Useful properties about µ(m)i (t) include the following: (i) for m = 0, µ
(0)
i (t) is
the occupational probability of mode i, i.e., µ(0)i (t) = Pr{Q(t) = i}; (ii) the
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conditional moments can be computed as E[Xm(t)|Q(t) = i] = µmi (t)
µ
(0)
i (t)
; and
(iii) the state moment can be calculated as E[Xm(t)] =
∑
i∈Q µ
m
i (t).
1.3 Literature Review
In this thesis, we evaluate the impact of (i) measurement errors and (ii) mea-
surement delays on the stability performance of power systems with AGC.
To this end, we also develop a power system AGC simulation toolbox. We
also evaluate the impact of uncertain behaviors on the reliability measures of
systems coordinating DRRs. In this section, we present a review of existing
related work and identify the gaps that have not been studied.
1.3.1 Impact of Measurement Uncertainty
As mentioned previously, measurement integrity is paramount in power sys-
tem operations and control. However, measurement uncertainty is inevitable
due to miscellaneous phenomena, e.g., measuring device malfunction, and
delays and noise in communication channels. Furthermore, measurement
data is also vulnerable to intentional cyber attacks, which can introduce
engineered errors and, in turn, may significantly degrade system dynamic
performance.
Vulnerabilities due to cyber attacks in power system control and data ac-
quisition systems have been extensively documented (see e.g., [32]); therefore,
it is critical to comprehensively evaluate the impact of different types of mea-
surement uncertainties. In terms of the types of measurement uncertainty,
measurement data can be delayed (e.g., due to excessive communication traf-
fic or denial of service attacks, see [33], [34]); manipulated (e.g., due to man-
in-the-middle attacks, see [35]); or even lost (e.g., through a lossy network,
see [36], [37]). In this thesis, we focus on the impact of measurement errors
and delays.
Impact of Measurement Errors. The measurements may be manipu-
lated according to various scenarios for various purposes; thus, there is a
considerable number of related studies. For instance, [38] presents a class of
false data injection attacks that can modify the estimated system state in
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arbitrary ways. The authors of [39] evaluate the effects of erroneous mea-
surements on the power market. The authors of [40] investigate an integrity
attack on the measurements used in the AGC system performance to mis-
lead the operator to perform inappropriate control actions, which may subse-
quently trigger improper actions (e.g., load shedding, or generator isolation),
and even cause cascading failures. However, as mentioned previously, the
impact of measurement errors on the system dynamic performance has not
been studied yet.
Impact of Measurement Delays. The measurement delays may also
be of various forms. The work in [8] considered a system with delays taking
values in a finite set, and studied its stability. The work in [41] studied a real-
time control system with random delays obeying independent probabilistic
distributions; the stability of the system with zero mean disturbance was
analyzed. The work in [42] experimentally measured and analyzed the delay
errors in an Ethernet-based communication infrastructure for power systems.
The work in [43] studied the impact of communication delays on electricity
markets. However, the impact of measurement delays on the power system
dynamic performance has not been studied yet.
1.3.2 Impact of Uncertainty in DRRs
There is a significant number of works proposing mechanisms to enable the
utilization of DRRs. For example, in [44] and [45], different market mech-
anisms to incorporate DRRs are explored; currently, most programs are
incentive-based, where customers receive payments for their participation.
Price-based programs, where customers respond according to dynamic pric-
ing, have been shown to be more efficient by the studies in [45]; however they
introduce a higher level of uncertainty in customer behavior.
From an operational perspective, as mentioned in Section 1.1, a consider-
able portion of DRRs are residential and commercial loads with the ability
to store thermal energy (e.g., commercial building HVAC systems)—a key
difference between these DRRs and conventional generation units is their en-
ergy limits. The authors in [46] and [47] present generalized battery models
to capture the dynamics of such thermal-storage capable DRRs and their
energy constraints; these constraints complicate the allocation/control algo-
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rithms. To overcome this problem, various control algorithms, mainly for
providing ancillary services, e.g., frequency regulation, have been explored
(see, e.g., [48], [49]). However, given that the behavior of DRRs is differ-
ent from that of conventional generation units, it is important to study the
reliability of DRR aggregation systems.
Reliability analysis of traditional power systems has been studied for decades
(see, e.g., [20], [25], and the references therein). Many probabilistic reliabil-
ity evaluation techniques are based on Markov chain models, where random
failures and repairs are captured by transitions in and out of the states of
the chain (see., e.g., [50]). Then, the probability distribution of generation
and load can be obtained, from which other reliability metrics can be com-
puted. However, Markov-chain models are not powerful enough to evaluate
the reliability of DRR aggregation systems as they cannot capture the con-
tinuous dynamics and energy constraints of DRRs; in this thesis we focus on
addressing this problem.
1.4 Thesis Contribution and Organization
We have identified some gaps in the impact of uncertainty on power systems.
The goal of this thesis is to fill these gaps and develop models and methods to
evaluate the impact of measurement uncertainty on power system dynamic
performance as well as the impact of uncertain phenomena on power systems
coordinating DRRs. Next, we detail the contents of each chapter along with
the main contribution in each.
Chapter 2. In this chapter, we focus on evaluating the impact of measure-
ment errors on dynamic performance of power systems with AGC. Measure-
ment errors are classified as deterministic and random. The main contribu-
tion of this chapter is an analytical evaluation framework that can capture
both random and deterministic measurement errors.
Specifically, we focus on two types of deterministic errors—constant and
scaling errors, as well as their corresponding random counterparts; and we
identify a class of errors with critical parameter values that cause unsatis-
factory system performance and even loss of stability. By utilizing singular
perturbation arguments to derive a reduced-order model of the system dy-
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namics, we present an analytically tractable method to examine the impact of
different erroneous measurements and to explicitly identify critical parameter
values.
Most of the work presented in this chapter was submitted for publication
(see [51]); preliminary results were published in [52].
Chapter 3. In this chapter, we focus on the impact of measurement delays
on dynamic performance of power systems with AGC. We present a method
to determine the system stability under both deterministic and random mea-
surement delays. The proposed analysis method is illustrated and verified
through case studies.
The work presented in this chapter was published in [34].
Chapter 4. In order to simulate the dynamics of AGC systems, in this
chapter, we augment the capabilities of the power system toolbox (PST),
a MATLAB-based package for simulating power system electromechanical
dynamics, so as to enable the possibility of including the AGC system in
simulations. In the process, we have also modified the linearization capability
of the PST to include the effect of the AGC system when enabled in the
simulation.
The work presented in this chapter was submitted for publication (see [53]).
Chapter 5. In this chapter, we focus on the impact of uncertain phenom-
ena on the reliability of systems coordinating DRRs. Specifically, we present
a method to evaluate the impact of DRR random failures and repairs on the
capacity-duration curve of systems that coordinates DRRs. To this end, we
develop a stochastic hybrid system (SHS) mode, the extended generator of
which gives a set of ordinary differential equations that governs the evolution
of the system state moments. Then, we can estimate the probability that
the system can successfully provide a certain amount of power for a period
of time. Subsequently, by varying the values of power and duration, we can
construct a probability-power-duration contour; and by setting the probabil-
ity to a desired a confidence level, we can obtain the capacity-duration curve
of the system with the corresponding confidence level.
The work presented in this chapter was submitted for publication (see [54]).
15
Chapter 6. In the final chapter, we summarize the contributions made in
this thesis with respect to the impact of cyber-physical uncertainty on both
transmission and distribution system performance. The thesis culminates
with some concluding remarks and future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2
IMPACT OF CYBER-PHYSICAL EVENTS
ON POWER SYSTEMS WITH AGC:
MEASUREMENT ERRORS
In this chapter, we propose a framework to evaluate the impact on power
system dynamic performance of different types of errors in the measurements
utilized by the automatic generation control (AGC) system. To address
the random nature of these errors, stochastic system analysis methods are
utilized to evaluate the statistics of system state variables. By examining the
convergence of these statistics, errors that cause instability are identified. A
reduced-order model, obtained by using singular perturbations arguments, is
also formulated to provide an explicit expression for the impact evaluation.
The proposed method is illustrated and verified through several case studies
with different types of errors on a simplified New England/New York system
model.
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the impact of errors in the measurements uti-
lized by the automatic generation control (AGC) system, which, as described
in Chapter 1, is currently the only system-level closed-loop control system
across both the cyber and physical layers of a power system [28]. These mea-
surements acquired at various points of the physical power system network
are transmitted to the control center over a cyber network. It is obvious then
that measurement data quality is critical to system performance in the sense
that measurement errors (e.g., false data injection over the communication
channels) may mislead the calculation involved in the AGC algorithms and
severely affect the overall system performance.
In this chapter, we classify measurement errors as deterministic and ran-
dom. While most previous works focus on deterministic errors, in this thesis,
we develop an analytical evaluation framework that can capture random mea-
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surement errors as well. Building on our previous results reported in [52], we
propose a stochastic differential equation (SDE) framework to capture the
system dynamics under random phenomena (due to measurement errors).
Then, we apply the SDE analysis techniques proposed in [55] to evaluate the
statistics of the system state variables (such as frequency). With this, we
can investigate system stability when both deterministic and random errors
exist in the measurements, and identify a class of errors with critical param-
eter values that cause unsatisfactory system performance and even loss of
stability.
We also propose an analytically tractable method to examine the impact
of different erroneous measurements (e.g., errors in frequency measurements,
and errors in generation output measurements) and to explicitly identify
critical parameter values. To this end, we utilize singular perturbation argu-
ments to derive a reduced-order model of the system dynamics which assumes
that the AGC dynamics dominate the system dynamic behavior in the time
scale of interest. With this model, we can analytically examine the impact
of different erroneous measurement variables. Frequency measurement errors
are shown to be critical to system stability. We show that although errors in
generation output measurements will not affect the system stability charac-
teristics, they can significantly degrade system performance. The accuracy
of the reduced-order model is verified through a case study, involving a 68-
bus model of the New England/New York power system. Specifically, we
consider (i) a comprehensive model capturing the power system electrome-
chanical dynamics and AGC dynamics (i.e., a full-order model), and (ii) a
reduced-order model obtained under the aforementioned assumption. For
each of these models, we identify the range of error parameter values that
destabilize the system. As expected, the parameter value range identified us-
ing the reduced-order model is a close approximation of that identified using
the full-order model.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents
the modeling framework, including the power system electromechanical dy-
namics model, the AGC sytem model, and the measurement model. Sec-
tion 2.3 describes the proposed assessment method. Section 2.4 showcases
the analysis framework using the reduced-order model obtained from singu-
lar perturbation arguments. Section 2.5 discusses some issues with practical
AGC systems, as well as some ideas for detection and mitigation. Section 2.6
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illustrates the analysis framework on a 68-bus power system. Concluding re-
marks are presented in Section 2.7.
2.2 Modeling Framework
In this section, we first briefly present the modeling framework adopted in
this thesis, which, as described in Chapter 1, includes the standard power-
system electromechanical dynamics model, and the AGC system model. The
measurement model is also presented in this section.
2.2.1 Power System Model with AGC
The electromechanical behavior of a power system can be described by a set
of differential algebraic equations (DAEs) of the form (see, e.g., [27]):
x˙ = f(x, y, u), (2.1a)
0 = g(x, y, p), (2.1b)
where x(t) ∈ Rn contains the dynamic states of synchronous generators,
including rotor electrical angular position, angular velocity and mechanical
torque; y(t) ∈ Rm denotes the system algebraic states, including bus voltage
magnitudes and angles; p(t) ∈ Ro represents the load profile; u(t) ∈ Rl
includes the generator set points; f : Rn+m+l 7→ Rn describes the evolution
of the dynamic states; and g : Rn+m+o 7→ Rm describes the power flow
equations.
The generator set point vector u(t) is determined by the AGC. The AGC
system takes the measurements of the BA area frequency, real interchange
power between BA areas and the generators’ output; calculates the area
control error (ACE); and determines the generator set points. The AGC
system dynamics can be described by
z˙ = h1(γ
meas, z), (2.2a)
u = k(z), (2.2b)
where z(t) ∈ Rp represents the states involved in AGC; γmeas(t) ∈ Rq indi-
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cates the measurements serving as inputs to the AGC system; h1 : Rp+q 7→
Rp describes the evolution of z; and k : Rp 7→ Rl describes how the generator
set point vector u(t) is determined based on a set of participation factors [56].
2.2.2 Measurement Model
Next, we present the measurement error models considered in this work.
Errors can be introduced from malicious attacks, measurement device mal-
function, or inherent measurement noise. Two types of common deterministic
errors have been categorized in [40]. In this work, we generalize these deter-
ministic errors and consider their corresponding random counterparts.
2.2.2.1 Deterministic Errors
Two types of errors are considered. The first type of error is the one that
shifts the true value of measurement i by a constant value α1,i:
γmeasi = γi + α1,i, (2.3)
where γi is the actual value. The second type is called scaling error and is
characterized as follows:
γmeasi = γi + α2,iγi, (2.4)
where α2,i ∈ R.
2.2.2.2 Random Errors
Like the first type of deterministic error decribed in (2.3), a random error
that shifts the true value of measurement i can be described as
γmeasi = γi + α3,iw˙i, (2.5)
where wi is a Wiener process and α3,i ∈ R. Note that this type of error
introduces white noise in the measurements since white noise can be viewed as
the generalized mean-square derivative of the Wiener process [57]. Similarly,
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like the second type of deterministic error in Section 2.2.2.1, a random error
that results in the scaling of measurement i can be described as follows:
γmeasi = γi + α4,iγiw˙i, (2.6)
where α4,i ∈ R.
2.2.2.3 General Model
The measurement variables that are used as inputs to the AGC system can
be expressed as a function of the dynamic state x and the system algebraic
state y. Note that although the derivative of bus voltage angles may appear
when calculating the area frequency, the derivative of y can be expressed
as an algebraic function of x and y by using (1.1). Assume that there are r
measurements corrupted by random errors as described by the models in (2.5)
and (2.6). Then, the measurement model can be generalized and expressed
in a compact form as
γmeas = h2(x, y) +
r∑
i=1
ηi(x, y)w˙i, (2.7)
where h2 : Rn+m 7→ Rq captures the actual measurement values and deter-
ministic errors, wi’s are independent Wiener processes, and ηi : Rn+m 7→ Rq
maps to a zero vector except for one nonzero element that represents the
intensity of the corresponding random error term.
2.3 Assessing the Impact of Measurement Errors
In this section, we develop a method to assess the impact on power system
dynamic performance of the measurement errors discussed in Section 2.2.
In this method, the DAE model consisting of (2.1), (2.2) and (2.7) is first
linearized along a nominal trajectory to form a linear stochastic differential
equation (SDE) model. Then, SDE analysis techniques are used to investi-
gate the impact of random measurement errors.
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2.3.1 Linearization
Assuming the power system with AGC described by (2.1), (2.2) and (2.7)
evolves from a set of initial conditions and the measurements are error
free, a nominal trajectory (x∗(t), y∗(t), z∗(t), γ∗(t), u∗(t)) results. As a conse-
quence of measurement errors, the state variable trajectories become x(t) =
x∗(t)+∆x(t), y(t) = y∗(t)+∆y(t), z(t) = z∗(t)+∆z(t), γ(t) = γ∗(t)+∆γ(t),
u(t) = u∗(t) + ∆u(t). Assume that the functions f, g, h1, k, h2 are continu-
ously differentiable with respect to their arguments, and the Jacobian of g(·)
in (1.1b) with respect to y is always invertable along the trajectories.1 For
notational convenience, we drop the dependence on t in subsequent devel-
opments. Then, by linearizing the model along the nominal trajectory, and
substituting the algebraic states into the differential equations, we can obtain
a linear stochastic differential equation (SDE) model of the form
dX
dt
= AX +
r∑
i=1
Biηiw˙i, (2.8)
whereX = [∆xT ,∆zT ]T ∈ Rn+p. Note that the impact of deterministic errors
is captured in the matrix A. If A possesses eigenvalues with positive real
parts, it suggests that the considered measurement error causes the system
to become unstable.
2.3.2 Statistical Moment Analysis
In order to evaluate the impact of random measurement errors, we can apply
Dynkin’s formula (see, e.g., [55]) to obtain a set of ordinary differential equa-
tions (ODEs) describing the dynamics of statistical moments (up to arbitrary
order) of the system state variables. In this work, we focus on the evolution
of the state mean and covariance; the explicit derivation of the equations
that govern these can be found in [58].
1The implicit function theorem then ensures the existence of an explicit relation be-
tween y(t) and x(t).
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2.3.2.1 The Impact of Random Error with Constant Intensity
For the error model described in (2.5), since α3,i is a constant, ηi maps to a
constant vector. Then, we have that the first and second moments of system
states in (2.8) evolve according to
dE[X]
dt
= AE[X], (2.9a)
dΣ
dt
= AΣ + ΣAT +B1η1η
T
1 B
T
1 , (2.9b)
where Σ = E[XXT ].
Assume the original system without measurement errors is stable, meaning
that the real parts of the eigenvalues of A are negative. Equation (2.9a) shows
that the state mean is not affected by the error term and converges to zero
eventually. Letting the left-hand side of (2.9b) be zero results in a Lyapunov
equation. Since matrix B1η1ηT1 BT1 is symmetric and positive definite, the
Lyapunov stability theorem guarantees that there exists a positive definite
matrix Σ satisfying this Lyapunov equation [59], meaning that the covariance
matrix steady-state value exists and is finite.
2.3.2.2 The Impact of Random Error with Scaling Intensity
Here, we show that the random error model in (2.6) may cause the system
state covariance matrix to become unstable, which means that the system
will not converge in the mean square sense and the realized sample path will
go unbounded [60]. Let ∆γi = ∆γi + α4,i∆γiw˙i; then, through linearization
and substitution of algebraic states using power flow equations, we can obtain
that η1 can be evaluated as:
η1 = α4,1H1X, (2.10)
where H1 ∈ Rq×(n+p). Then (2.8) becomes
X˙ = AX + α4,1B1H1Xw˙1 := AX + α4,1Bˆ1Xw˙1, (2.11)
where Bˆ1 ∈ R(n+p)×(n+p) equals B1H1.
The equations governing the evolution of the first and second moments of
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the system states are given by
dE[X]
dt
= AE[X], (2.12a)
dΣ
dt
= AΣ + ΣAT + α24,1Bˆ1ΣBˆ1
T
. (2.12b)
In this case, it is possible that the system in (2.12b) is unstable due to the
error term α24,1Bˆ1ΣBˆ1
T
. In order to evaluate the effects on system stability,
we rearrange the entries of the matrix Σ into a vector Φ. Define the ith
row of Σ by Σi; then Φ = [Σ1Σ2 · · ·Σn+p]T . Thus, Equation (2.12b) can be
rewritten as
dΦ
dt
= DΦ, (2.13)
where D = I ⊗ A + A ⊗ I + α24,1Bˆ1 ⊗ Bˆ1, I denotes a (n + p) × (n + p)
identity matrix, and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product [61]. By properly
choosing α4,1, it is possible to make positive the real part of some of the
eigenvalues of D, which would cause the system to become unstable. Note
that at this point, even though the system state mean is stable; the system
state covariance becomes unstable. Eventually, this causes the divergence of
system states in a realized sample path.
2.3.2.3 The Impact of Multiple General Random Errors
Note that besides these two common types of random errors described in Sec-
tion 2.2.2.2, for any continuous error function ηi’s, the same method applies.
For multiple measurement errors, (2.12b) becomes
dΣ
dt
= AΣ + ΣAT +
r∑
i=1
α24,iBˆiΣBˆ
T
i , (2.14)
where Bˆi = 0 if ηi maps to a constant vector. The effects on system stability
can be evaluated by following the aforementioned procedure of constructing
(2.13); the matrix D in (2.13) is determined based on the scaling parameters,
i.e., α4,i’s.
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2.4 Analysis with Reduced-Order Models
In this section, we utilize singular perturbation arguments (see, e.g., [62],
[63]) to derive a reduced-order model of the system dynamics. With this
simplified model, we are able to: (i) explicitly investigate the impact of
different erroneous measurements (e.g., erroneous frequency measurement,
and erroneous generation output measurements), and (ii) estimate the range
of parameter values that will make the system fail to perform satisfactorily.
2.4.1 Reduced-Order Dynamic Model
We assume that the time constants of the electromechanical dynamics are
much smaller than those of the AGC system. Therefore, the time scales of
these two subsystems are decoupled, and we expect the AGC dynamics to
dominate the system dynamic behavior in the time scale of interest. (Similar
argument has been utilized in AGC system studies; see, e.g., [64].) Then, the
DAEs describing the electromechanical dynamics are converted to algebraic
equations by setting to zero the left-hand side of (1.1), and a reduced-order
model is obtained. Note that one may argue that this assumption is not
totally valid due to the high inertia of some generators in the bulk power
system. However, although there is small discrepancy between the trajectory
that results from the full-order model and the trajectory that results from the
reduced-order model, the stability properties are preserved between the full-
and reduced-order models given the original system (1.1) is stable, meaning
that if the measurement error destabilizes the reduced-order model, it will
destabilize the original system as well, and vice versa. This claim follows from
the result of Theorem 5.1 in [63], which states that the difference between
the full-order model trajectory and that of the reduced-order model is on
the order of the magnitude of the ratio of the fast and slow subsystem time
constants; therefore the difference is bounded. In addition, we assume that
the transmission network is lossless, which implies that the total generation
output is equal to the total demand, i.e.,
∑
i∈G PGi =
∑
j∈D PDj , where
G indicates the set of all generators, PGi denotes the electrical output of
generator i, D indicates the set of all the loads in the power system, and PDj
denotes the demand at load j. With these three assumptions, a reduced-order
dynamic model can be derived.
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Let Pi denote the turbine power, and P refi denote the generator set point.
Then, the inertia response and governor response of synchronous generators
are given by (see, e.g., [65]):
Mi
dωi
dt
= Pi − PGi −Di(ωi − ωs), (2.15a)
Ti
dPi
dt
= −Pi + P refi −
1
Ri
(ωi − ωs), (2.15b)
where ωi is the machine electrical rotational speed, while ws is the system
synchronous speed; Di is the damping coefficient; Mi is the scaled machine
inertia constant; Ti is the governor time constant; the gain Ri determines the
slope of the drooping governor characteristic; and PGi is the power output.
In steady state, the left-hand side of (2.15) is set to zero, and the governor
control induces a steady-state error in frequency, which causes all generators
to rotate at the same speed, i.e., ωi = ωo,∀i ∈ G. Then, by summing (2.15)
over all generators, the following algebraic relationship can be obtained:
z −
∑
i∈G
PGi = Γ∆f,
where ∆f = 2pi(ωo − ωs), and Γ = 2pi
∑
i∈G(
1
Ri
+ Di), which is called the
frequency response characteristic [66]. Then, by solving for ∆f , we obtain
∆f =
z −∑i∈G PGi
Γ
. (2.16)
Without loss of generality, we focus on the case with the singular BA
area and drop the subscript that indicates the BA area in the following
developments. Then, we have that ACE = β∆f , and
z˙ = −z − β∆f +
∑
i∈G
PGi . (2.17)
Plugging (2.16) into (2.17) and utilizing the lossless transmission network
assumption, we obtain that
z˙ = −β + Γ
Γ
(z −
∑
i∈D
PDi).
If β is set to be Γ as suggested in [66], the AGC dynamic model becomes
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z˙ = −2z + 2∑i∈D PDi , which is a stable ODE.
2.4.2 Impact of Erroneous Frequency Measurement
As discussed in Section 2.3, since the errors described in (2.3) and (2.5)
will not affect system stability in the mean square sense, we mainly focus
on the impact of the scaling errors in (2.4) and (2.6). Assume that there
is a scaling error in the frequency measurement, fmeas = f + α2∆f (i.e.,
∆fmeas = ∆f + α2∆f). Then, by replacing the true frequency value with
the erroneous measurement in (2.17), we obtain that
z˙ = −β(1 + α2) + Γ
Γ
(z −
∑
i∈D
PDi). (2.18)
Now, if α2 < −Γβ − 1, the system in (2.18) becomes unstable.
Assume the error is of random nature and can be described by the model
in (2.6), i.e., fmeas = f+α4∆fw˙. Then, by replacing the error-free frequency
measurement in (2.17) with this erroneous measurement model, we obtain
z˙ = −(β + Γ)∆f − βα4∆fw˙
= −β + Γ
Γ
(z −
∑
i∈D
PDi)−
βα4
Γ
(z −
∑
i∈D
PDi)w˙. (2.19)
Referring to the analysis in Section 2.3, we can see that if |α4| >
√
2(β+Γ)Γ
β2
,
the system in (2.19) does not converge in the mean square sense.
2.4.3 Impact of Erroneous Generation Output Measurement
Assume that there are deterministic errors in the output measurement of
generator k, i.e., PmeasGk = PGk + α2PGk , and the participation factor of this
generator is κk. From (2.16), we can obtain that the generation output in
steady state is given by
PGk = κkz − (
1
Rk
+Dk)∆f.
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Then, the total generation output measurement is∑
i∈G
PmeasGi = P
meas
Gk
+
∑
i 6=k
PGi
= z − Γ∆f + α2(κkz − ( 1
Rk
+Dk)∆f).
Replacing the actual generation output value with the erroneous measure-
ment, the dynamics of the AGC system can be described as
z˙ = (α2κk − ξ)z − ξ
∑
i∈D
PGi , (2.20)
where ξ =
β+Γ+α2(
1
Rk
+Dk)
Γ
. For α2 > β+ΓΓκk−( 1Rk +Dk)
, the AGC system becomes
unstable. Note that if κk =
1
Rk
+Dk∑
i
1
Ri
+Di
, there exists no α2 that destabilizes
the system. However, this error can make the system frequency converge
to an unacceptable value (e.g., below a certain threshold that triggers load
shedding schemes). By setting the right-hand side of (2.20) to zero, the
frequency deviation in steady state is α2κk
∑
PGi
β+Γ−α2(κkΓ− 1Rk−Dk)
. Note that this
frequency deviation value is proportional to the total value of the demand,
which can be very large. As shown in Section 2.6, this error can easily make
the system frequency go beyond the acceptable threshold.
If the error is of random nature and is described in (2.6), i.e., PmeasGk =
PGk + α4PGkw˙, we have that
z˙ = −β + Γ
Γ
(z −
∑
i∈D
PDi) + ζ(z)w˙, (2.21)
where ζ(z) = α4(κk−
1
Rk
+Dk
Γ
)z+α4
1
Rk
+Dk
Γ
∑
i∈D PDi . Denote C1 = −β+ΓΓ , C2 =
α4κk−α4
1
Rk
+Dk
Γ
, and C3 =
α4κk
∑
i∈D PDi
Γ
. Using the method described in Sec-
tion 2.3, we obtain that
dE[∆f ]
dt
= C1E[∆f ],
dE[∆f 2]
dt
= (2C1 + C
2
2)E[∆f 2] + +2C2C3E[∆f ] + C23 ,
from which, we can see that the frequency mean converges to zero. If 2C1 +
28
C22 > 0, the system becomes unstable in the mean square sense; otherwise,
the frequency variance converges to a nonzero value, − C23
2C1+C22
, which may
cause violations of some frequency requirement standards, e.g., CPS1 [67].
2.5 Discussions with Practical AGC Systems
In this section, we discuss the impact of measurement errors in the context
of practical AGC systems, where AGC suspension mechanisms are imple-
mented. From the point of view of defending against an attack, we also
discuss the challenge of detecting measurement errors in SCADA systems
and propose ideas to address this challenge by integrating the SCADA sys-
tem with the wide area measurement system (WAMS).
2.5.1 AGC with Suspension Schemes and Load Shedding
In practice, some AGC implementation guidelines are recommended in order
to limit the impact of erroneous measurements and emergency events. The
Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) suggests that AGC sus-
pension should be considered when the system frequency deviation is greater
than a threshold, fagc [68]. At the same time, underfrequency load shedding
relays are commonly installed to shed load when the frequency is below a
threshold, fld [40]. In this regard, if the frequency measurement used by
AGC reaches the threshold fagc before the actual frequency falls below fld,
AGC will be suspended, and the impact on system performance will be lim-
ited. On the other hand, if the actual frequency falls below the threshold fld
before AGC is suspended, the low frequency value will trigger load shedding.
Therefore, for the deterministic scaling attack on the frequency measure-
ments to cause severe impact, it requires that the erroneous measurement
does not trigger the AGC suspension, i.e.,
|∆fmeas| = |∆f + α2∆f | < fagc,
when the actual frequency reaches the limit to trigger load shedding, i.e.,
fnorm + ∆f = fld,
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which gives an extra constraint on the parameter α2: α2 < −1 + fagcfld−fnorm .
For the case of a random attack, there is a nonzero probability that the
erroneous frequency measurements will reach the threshold fagc to suspend
the AGC. However, WECC also recommends that the lower-than-threshold
condition should be verified for a few AGC cycles before actually suspending
AGC, in order to avoid using frequency suspension schemes. Taking this
into account, the probability for erroneous frequency measurements to be
consecutively lower than the threshold is very small. Therefore, it is still very
likely that such attacks would cause serious impacts on system operations.
2.5.2 Error Detection and Mitigation
Even with the current AGC suspension protection scheme as described in
Section 2.5.1, the aforementioned potential severe impact of erroneous mea-
surements highlights the importance of measurement integrity used in AGC
systems. Thus, error detection methods are required to maintain measure-
ment integrity.
The integrity of power measurements can be protected by bad data detec-
tion mechanisms implemented in the SCADA system state estimation pro-
cess; this has been extensively studied (see, e.g., [3]). However, it is difficult
to ensure the integrity of frequency measurements because the frequency
variable is not included in the SCADA steady-state estimation process. One
way to address this issue, implied by the steady-state study on AGC attacks
in [64], is to utilize the steady-state relationship between the power mismatch
and the frequency in (2.16). However, since this is based on the reduced-order
model obtained via singular perturbation, this method may not be accurate
when system dynamics are considered.
Another method is to incorporate synchrophasor measurements, provided
by phasor measurement units (PMUs) in the wide-area measurement sys-
tem (WAMS), into the SCADA system. One intuitive way is to compare
frequency measurements from the SCADA system with those measured by
PMUs. But when there is a discrepancy, it is difficult to determine which
ones should be trusted. To address this issue, we utilize the fact that PMUs
measure frequencies based on the derivative of phase angles; thus, their in-
tegrity can be assured via state estimation in the SCADA system. In other
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words, PMU relates the frequency measurements with the variables that are
used in the SCADA state estimator. If the frequency measurement from a
PMU is offset, the phasor angle measurement will also be inaccurate. This
can be directly detected through the bad data detection algorithms in the
state estimator. For example, consider an error  is introduced to the PMU
frequency measurement. The error will cause an error of 360T degrees in the
angle measurement for a short period of time T , which will be well beyond
the tolerance margin of the bad data detection algorithm. Therefore, the
errors added to the frequency measurements can be detected by integrating
SCADA and WAMS systems.
2.6 Case Studies
2.6.1 A 4-Bus System
In this section, we illustrate the ideas described in this chapter by using
the 4-bus power system depicted in Fig. 2.1. This power system model con-
sists of two synchronous generators, one renewable generation unit and one
load. A complete list of the system model parameters, including these of the
AGC, can be found in [56]. The dynamics of each synchronous machine is
described by a third-order model that captures the governor dynamics and
the mechanical equations of motion [65]; we choose the angle of machine 1
as the reference angle. Thus, there are five dynamic states associated with
1 4
2
3
V1∠θ1
V2∠θ2
Pw P3 + jQ3
V3∠θ3
V4∠θ4
Figure 2.1: A 4-bus 2-machine system [56].
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(c) One sample path of frequency deviation and imposed noise.
Figure 2.2: Fixed intensity noise in frequency measurement on machine 1.
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(c) Second moment of frequency deviation.
Figure 2.3: Various intensity noise in frequency measurement on machine 1.
33
0 2 4 6 8 10−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
t[s]
E
[∆
f
]
[H
z]
(a) Mean value of frequency deviation.
0 2 4 6 8 10−1
0
1
2
3
4
5x 10
11
t[s]
E
[∆
f
2
]
[H
z2
]
(b) Second moment of frequency deviation.
0 2 4 6 8 10−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
t[s]
∆
f
[H
z]
 
 
noise
sample path
(c) One sample path of frequency deviation and imposed noise.
Figure 2.4: Various intensity noise in frequency measurement on machine 2.
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Figure 2.5: Various intensity noise in both frequency measurements.
the synchronous machines, and one state for the AGC system. Without loss
of generality, the AGC system takes measurements of the frequencies and
power output of machines 1 and 2. Therefore, in this system, n = 5, p = 1,
and q = 4. As expected, all the eigenvalues of the matrix A for this system
have negative real parts.
First, we consider the frequency measurement of machine 1. As a compar-
ison, we first model measurement noise as white noise with fixed intensity,
meaning that η is a constant vector in (2.7). In this case, all the entries
of η are zero except for the first one, which is 12.56. The mean and sec-
ond moment of the frequency variation are depicted in Figures 2.2(a) and
2.2(b). The results obtained from Monte Carlo simulations, depicted with
a solid line, match with those obtained by the proposed analytical method,
depicted with a dashed line; this demonstrates the validity of the analyti-
cal method. Consistent with the discussion in Section 2.3.2.1, the variance
of frequency deviation converges to 0.18Hz2, which agrees with the results
obtained by solving (2.9b). The frequency variation of one arbitrary sample
path obtained using the nonlinear model in (1.1), (4.2), and (2.7), as well
as the imposed noise, are depicted in Fig. 2.2(c), which illustrates that the
measurement noise affects the system performance and, at the same time,
AGC is able to limit the influence to an acceptable margin.
Now, we consider the random noise model described in Section 2.3.2.2.
In this case, H1 in (2.10) is a 4 × 6 matrix with all elements being zero
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except the first row, which corresponds to the first measurement, i.e., the
frequency measurement. The value of α4,1 is set to be 12.56 so that matrix
D in (2.13) has a positive eigenvalue. For the sample path in Fig. 2.3(c)
obtained from one Monte Carlo simulation using the nonlinear DAE model,
we can observe that the values of the added noise processes are in the same
order of the frequency variation. Note that other control mechanisms will be
certainly triggered before the system frequency variation becomes larger than
a certain threshold; however, the added noise causes the system performance
to degrade significantly. Furthermore, the response of other control and
protection mechanisms, e.g., under-frequency or over-frequency protection
relays, may lead to load shedding, and generator tripping.
Similarly, we investigate the impact of noise in the frequency measurement
of machine 2. The mean and second moment, as well as a sample path of
the frequency variation are shown in Fig. 2.4. Comparing Figs. 2.3 and
2.4, one can observe that the added noise does not affect the mean of the
system states; however, it affects the second moment and any realized sample
path. Now, we look at the impact of the random noise in the frequency
measurements of two machines. Following the formulas in (2.7) and (2.14),
we set α4,1 = α4,2 = 6.28, which make one of the eigenvalues of D positive.
One sample path of the frequency variation is plotted in Fig. 2.5. Note that
in this case, the random noise with smaller intensity in each measurement,
compared to the case where a single measurement noise is considered, causes
system instability.
2.6.2 A 68-Bus System
In this part, we demonstrate the impact of the aforementioned measurement
errors on a 68-bus 16-machine system, which is a representative model of the
New England/New York interconnected power system. Its one-line diagram
and detailed description can be found in [69]. Each of the 16 generator units is
modeled by a combination of a synchronous machine model, an exciter model,
a power system stabilizer model, and a turbine/governor model. A single BA
area is assumed in the AGC system model, and β is set to
∑
i∈G
1
Ri
+Di, which
is 1.5929 × 104. We utilized the MATLAB-based Power System Toolbox
(PST) to implement the AGC algorithms and simulate the system dynamics;
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the details can be found in Chapter 4. The data of this system is part of the
PST suite and can be found in [70]. The linearized system is also obtained by
making use of the the small-signal analysis function provided in PST. The
eigenvalue corresponding to the AGC system is −0.001, while the largest
one of the rest eigenvalues that correspond to the system electromechanical
dynamics is −0.1004. The high ratio of these two eigenvalues supports the
singular perturbation argument utilized in Section 2.4 to derive a reduced-
order model of the power system electromechanical behavior. In addition,
we also validate the resulting reduced-order model by comparing the critical
error parameter values obtained using the full- and reduced-order models
respectively.
Before proceeding in Sections 2.6.2.2 and 2.6.2.3 with the system perfor-
mance impact analysis of different measurement errors, we first conduct some
analysis to verify the accuracy of our linearization procedure when utilized to
study the New England/New York system model. To this end, we compare
the trajectories obtained by simulating the system nonlinear DAE model
with those obtained through the linearized model.
2.6.2.1 Accuracy of the Linearized Model
We illustrate the accuracy of the linearized model with AGC by considering
two scenarios. First, we assume that there is a 0.1 p.u. variation from the
nominal value in each load. We plot the resulting trajectories of the frequency
deviation obtained with the nonlinear and linearized models in Fig. 2.6(a),
where we can see that the trajectories are close to each other.
In the second scenario, we assume that there are random errors in the
frequency measurements. The measurement error is assumed to be white
noise. The results are shown in Fig. 2.6(b), where we plot one sample path
of the resulting frequency deviation trajectories obtained with the nonlinear
model (blue solid line) and linearized models (red dashed line). As one
can see, the linearized system trajectory approximates the nonlinear system
trajectory closely.
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Figure 2.6: Validation of the linearization process.
2.6.2.2 Impact of Deterministic Errors
Impact of Erroneous Frequency Measurement. We focus on the im-
pact of scaling errors discussed in Section 2.4.2. First from the reduced-order
model in (2.18), we obtain that the error parameter α2 should be less than
−2 in order for the system to become unstable. With the full-order model
described in (1.1), (4.2) and (2.7), after linearization and checking the eigen-
values of the matrix in (2.8), we find that with the error parameter being
less than −1.98, the system becomes unstable. The small mismatch may
come from the lossless network assumption. The relationship between the
maximum real part of the eigenvalues and the error parameter is depicted in
Fig. 2.7(a). Note that due to the fact that there is always a theoretical zero
eigenvalue (caused by choosing one angle variable as the reference angle in
PST), the maximum eigenvalue is zero when the system is stable. We also
vary the system operating point by randomly changing the load and genera-
tion values 100 times. At each time, the load and generation values at each
bus are multiplied by an independent random variable, which is uniformly
distributed between 0.5 and 1.2. Except for the cases that are not feasible
(i.e., no power flow solutions), the critical point stays at −1.98 for all the
other cases as shown in Fig. 2.7(b). Choose α2 = 2.1, and the full-order
model is used in the simulation. The resulting system frequency and the
AGC variable z (i.e., the sum of the generators’ set points) are depicted by
the red dashed line in Fig. 2.8, which illustrates that the system becomes
unstable.
Note that in practice, the AGC is implemented in a discrete time fashion.
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Figure 2.8: System dynamic performance with deterministic error in the
frequency measurement.
We simulate the system performance with a discrete implementation of the
AGC model with a sample-and-hold period of 2 s, and the results are plotted
by the blue solid line in Fig. 2.8 as well, which shows that the system is
unstable and the system variables even diverge more severely.
Impact of Erroneous Generation Output Measurement. Determin-
istic errors are added to the generation output measurement. The results
of our experiments are consistent with the analysis on the generation mea-
surement errors in Section 2.4.3. This type of error does not destabilize the
system when described by the linear model or the full-order model. But the
error will drive the system frequency beyond the satisfactory region (here
we consider frequency deviation being smaller than 0.05 Hz as satisfactory
performance). For this system, if the scaling error with α2 being 0.061 is
introduced in the generation output measurement of generation unit 16, the
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Figure 2.9: System performance with deterministic error in the generation
measurement.
dynamics of the system variables (i.e., the system frequency and the AGC
variable z) are depicted in Fig. 2.9, where one can see that the system con-
verges to a steady state. However, the absolute value of the system frequency
deviation stays larger than 0.05 Hz. Also note that the critical value of α2
depends on the total value of demand. Therefore, if the power demand in
this system is doubled, α2 = 0.03 will drive the system frequency beyond the
safety region.
2.6.2.3 Impact of Random Errors
Impact of Erroneous Frequency Measurement. Consider the scaling
random error model in (2.6). First, by using (2.19), we obtain that the
error parameter α4 should be larger than 2 in order to drive the system
to be unstable in the mean square sense. Then, with the full-order model
as described in (1.1), (4.2) and (2.7), after linearization and checking the
eigenvalues of the matrix in (2.8), we find that for the error parameter being
larger than 2.3, the system becomes unstable in the mean square sense. In
order to get the statistics of the system state variables, one can numerically
solve the ODEs in (2.12b) that govern the evolution of state variables’ first
and second moments. An alternative is to run a Monte Carlo simulation
10, 000 times and estimate the statistics using the resulting 10, 000 sample
paths. For α4 = 2.4, the mean and variance of the frequency deviation
when using both methods are plotted in Fig. 2.10. The closeness of the
results obtained from both methods verifies the accuracy of our stochastic
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Figure 2.10: Mean and variance of frequency deviation.
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Figure 2.11: System performance with random error in the frequency
measurement.
system analysis procedure. The figure also shows that although the mean
stays stable, the variance diverges. Thus, the system becomes unstable in
the mean square sense. One unstable sample path of the system frequency
and the AGC variable z are depicted in Fig. 2.11.
Impact of Erroneous Generation Output Measurement. The results
of our experiment are consistent with the analysis with the reduced-order
model in (2.21). This type of measurement error does not destabilize the
system with either the linear system or the full-order system model in the
mean square sense. Following the same Monte Carlo and ODE simulation
procedure described above, the mean and variance of the frequency devia-
tion are obtained. The mean converges to zero. Figure 2.12(a) depicts the
variance when the scaling random error with α4 = 0.061 is injected into the
generation output measurement of unit 16. This figure confirms that unlike
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Figure 2.12: System performance with random error in the generation
measurement.
the impact of random errors in frequency measurements that may destabilize
the system, in this case the variance will converge but not zero. One sample
path of the frequency deviation is plotted in Fig. 2.12(b), from which we can
observe that although the system converges in the mean square sense, the
frequency deviation is still very likely to go beyond the safety region (e.g.,
smaller than −0.05 Hz) due to the large variance.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter proposed a method to assess the impact on power system dy-
namic performance of various errors in the measurements utilized by the
AGC system. With this method, not only can we evaluate the impact of
deterministic errors but we can also evaluate that of random errors. We
can also identify the critical measurement errors that significantly degrade
the system performance and cause the system to become unstable. We have
observed that although AGC is robust to constant intensity (white noise)
errors, a class of random error with scaling intensity will cause the system
to become unstable in the mean square sense (i.e., divergence of the system
state for realized sample paths).
With the derived reduced-order system model, we have observed that scal-
ing (deterministic and random) errors in the frequency measurements can
cause the system to become unstable, while errors in the generation output
measurements can drive the system to converge to a state that is not satis-
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factory in terms of performance. The method was applied to a 68-bus New
England/New York power system to numerically verify these statements.
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CHAPTER 3
IMPACT OF CYBER-PHYSICAL EVENTS
ON POWER SYSTEMS WITH AGC:
MEASUREMENT DELAYS
In this chapter, we investigate the impact of communication delays on the
performance of power system automatic generation control (AGC). To this
end, we formulate a hybrid system model that describes the power system
electromechanical behavior, including the AGC system dynamics. Through
linearization and discretization, this hybrid system model is converted into
a discrete-time linear time-invariant system model that includes the effect
of delays in the AGC system communication channels. The stability of the
closed-loop system can then be determined by examining the characteris-
tics of the state-transition matrix of the aforementioned discrete-time linear
system. We carefully analyze the stability of systems with random communi-
cation delays and nonzero mean random disturbances. The proposed analysis
methodology is illustrated and verified through numerical examples.
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we studied the impact of measurement noise on power system
AGC performance. In this chapter, we focus on studying the impact of
communication delays, which arises from network traffic or malicious attacks.
Due to the discrete nature of the sampling process in AGC, the electrome-
chanical behavior of a power system can be modeled as a hybrid system
containing a continuous-time subsystem describing the physical layer dy-
namics, and a discrete-time subsystem describing the dynamics of the AGC
algorithms. Various approaches to analyze such hybrid system models have
been explored. One common step is to formulate a consistent discrete-time
system; specifically, through discretization with the same time interval as in
the discrete-time subsystem, the continuous-time subsystem can be reformu-
lated as a discrete-time subsystem. Then, by linearizing, one can study the
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stability of the overall system. When communication delays are considered,
the system state at the next time step does not only depend on the control
command in the previous time step, but also on the second to last command.
This can be captured during the discretization process by dividing the time
interval into two parts, the time before the new command arrives and the
time after. Note that generally, there are frequency-domain and time-domain
methods to address the impact of time delays on system performance. For in-
stance, [71] proposed a frequency-domain method to evaluate such impact on
automatic voltage regulators and power system stabilizers. However, the hy-
brid nature of the AGC system, as well as the uncertainty on the time delays
introduced from the communication network, makes the frequency-domain
method not applicable in this study.
In this chapter, we propose a framework to evaluate the impact of commu-
nication delays on power system AGC performance. The electromechanical
behavior of the power system, including the AGC, is modeled as a hybrid
system. We then linearize each subsystem comprising the hybrid system us-
ing the same technique used in [72]. Disturbances to the linearized system
model are introduced as variable loads. Note that uncertain renewable gener-
ation can also be captured by treating it as a negative load. Building on this
hybrid system model, and adopting the discretization process in [8, 41], an
augmented discrete-time system can be formulated. Due to the large number
of communication delay causes, which can occur randomly, it is reasonable
to model delays as independent random variables obeying normal distribu-
tions. In order to analyze the stability of the system, dynamic equations of
the state first and second moments are formulated. Particularly, the nonzero
mean disturbance (i.e., variable load) makes the stability analysis for systems
with zero mean disturbance in [41] not applicable, and entails careful input-
to-state stability analysis. In this work, we will derive a stability criterion
for such systems with nonzero mean disturbance.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we
formulate the electromechanical behavior of the power system including the
effect of AGC, as a nonlinear hybrid system, which we then linearize and
reformulate as an discrete-time linear time invariant (LTI) system. In Sec-
tion 3.3, we evaluate the impact on the system performance of both determin-
istic and random communication delays. Section 3.4 illustrates the analysis
methodology via numerical examples. Concluding remarks and future work
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are presented in Section 3.5.
3.2 Power System with AGC Hybrid Model
In this section, we adopt the modeling framework described in Chapter 2 (i.e.,
the power system electromechanical dynamics modeled as a set of continuous
differential algebraic equations (DAEs), is briefly re-presented here), except
that the AGC system dynamics is described via a discrete-time state-space
model. The resulting hybrid model is then reformulated as a discrete-time
linear system through discretization and linearization.
3.2.1 Power System Model with AGC
3.2.1.1 Electromechanical Dynamics
We recall the standard DAE model to describe the power system electrome-
chanical behavior as presented in (1.1):
x˙ = f(x, y, u), (3.1a)
0 = g(x, y, p). (3.1b)
Note that there are multiple machine models to describe the dynamics of
different kinds of individual generators. For instance, a nine-state machine
model can be used for representing the dynamics of individual generators [73],
and correspondingly, nine dynamic states for each synchronous generator will
be included in x(t). In Section 3.4, following [65], we adopt a reduced-order
model, which only includes the mechanical equations and the governor dy-
namics, i.e., for each generator, only the rotor electrical angular position,
angular velocity and mechanical torque are included in x(t). Note that the
rotor angle position of a particular synchronous generator is chosen as the
reference, and all other angles are defined relative to it. Therefore, there are
only two dynamic states associated with this particular synchronous genera-
tor.
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3.2.1.2 AGC System
We also adopt the notation used in Chapter 2 for AGC systems, and recall
the expression of ACE for area a in (3.2):
ACEa(t) =
∑
a′∈Aa
(Pmeasaa′ (t)− P schaa′ (t)) + βa(fmeasa (t)− fnorm),∀a ∈ A, (3.2)
where βa is the bias factor, and Aa denotes the set of BA areas that are
connected to area a through tie lines.
Measurements are taken at discrete time instants; we denote the sample
interval as ∆t, and define za[k] := za(k∆t) and ACEa[k] := ACEa(k∆t).
Then, according to (1.3), the dynamics of za[k] is described by
za[k + 1] = za[k] + ∆t(−za[k] + ACEa[k] +
∑
i∈Ga
PGi [k]),
where PGi [k] = PGi(k∆t), i ∈ Ga, is the power output of generator i at
instant k∆t.
Then, we have that for each generator i ∈ Ga, the set point at instant k,
denoted by P refi [k], is determined as a function of za[k] as follows: P
ref
i [k] =
κaiza[k], where the κai ’s—the participation factors—are defined in Chapter
1. Then, the set points for all the generators in all BA areas form the vector
u[k], i.e., u[k] = {P refi [k]}i∈Ga,a∈A. Define z[k] = [z1[k], z2[k], · · · , zM [k]]T ,
where M is the total number of BAs, x[k] = x(k∆t), and y[k] = y(k∆t), and
note that the bus frequency is the derivative of the bus voltage angle with
respect to time, while the bus voltage angle is the element of y. Therefore, fm
can be obtained by computing y˙. Then, the AGC system can be described
in a compact form as
z[k + 1] = h3(z[k], x[k], y[k], y˙[k]), (3.3a)
u[k] = h4(z[k]). (3.3b)
The set points stay constant during the sample interval, i.e.,
u(t) = u[k], k∆t ≤ t < (k + 1)∆t.
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3.2.2 Linearization
Assume that the hybrid system model in (3.1) and (3.3) evolves toward an
equilibrium point (x∗, y∗, z∗, u∗) under a certain load profile p∗. Let x(t) =
x∗ + ∆x(t), y(t) = y∗ + ∆y(t), z[k] = z∗ + ∆z[k], and u[k] = u∗ + ∆u[k],
where ∆x(t),∆y(t),∆z[k] and ∆u[k] result from the change in the load profile
∆p(t) = p(t) − p∗. Assume the disturbance ∆p(t) is sufficiently small, such
that ∆x(t),∆y(t),∆z[k] and ∆u[k] are sufficiently small. By linearizing (3.1)
and (3.3) around (x∗, y∗, z∗, u∗), we obtain a set of linear equations of the form
∆x˙(t) =A1∆x(t) + A2∆y(t) +B1∆u(t), (3.4a)
0 =A3∆x(t) + A4∆y(t) + C1∆p(t), (3.4b)
∆z[k + 1] =A5∆x[k] + A6∆y[k] + A7∆y˙[k] +B2∆z[k], (3.4c)
∆u[k] =B3∆z[k], (3.4d)
where ∆x[k] = ∆x(k∆t), ∆y[k] = ∆y(k∆t), and A1 − A7, B1 − B3 and C1
are matrices obtained from the partial derivatives of the functions f , g, h3,
and h4 evaluated at the equilibrium point.
Assume that invertability of matrix A4 always holds; then, by substituting
∆y(t) and ∆u(t) into (3.4a) and (3.4c), we can obtain a hybrid model of the
form
∆x˙(t) = A9∆x(t) +B4∆z(t) + C2∆p(t), (3.5a)
∆z[k + 1] = A10∆x[k] +B5∆z[k] + C3∆p[k], (3.5b)
where
A9 = A1 − A2A−14 A3,
A10 = A5 − A6A−14 A3 + A7A−14 A3(A−14 A3 − A1),
B4 = B1B3, B5 = B2 − A7A−14 A3B1B3,
C2 = −A2A−14 C1, C3 = −A6A−14 C1;
∆p[k] = ∆p(k∆t); and ∆z[k] = ∆z(k∆t) for k∆t ≤ t < (k + 1)∆t. Note
that ∆y˙(t) can be expressed as a linear function of ∆x˙(t), which in turn is
a linear combination of ∆x(t),∆y(t) and ∆u(t). Therefore, we can evaluate
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the derivative of ∆y(t) as a linear combination of ∆x(t) and ∆u(t). Another
way to circumvent the use of ∆y˙(t) is to represent the deviation in the area
frequency as the electrical speed deviation of the generators in the area, which
are a subset of the elements of ∆x(t). Therefore, ∆fm(t) can be expressed as
a linear function of ∆x(t); then, ∆y˙(t) will not appear; and B5 = B2. The
accuracy of this approximation has been verified via simulations in [21].
3.2.3 Discretization
Next, we convert the hybrid system in (3.5) into a discrete-time linear system.
To this end, (3.5b) is discretized as follows,
∆x[k + 1] = Φ1∆x[k] + Γ1∆z[k] + Γ2∆p[k], (3.6)
where
Φ1 = e
A9∆t, Γ1 =
ˆ ∆t
0
eA9sdsB4, Γ2 =
ˆ ∆t
0
eA9sdsC2.
Combining (3.5) and (3.6), we obtain a linear discrete-time model of the
form
Xn[k + 1] = Φn(∆t)X[k] + Cn(∆t), (3.7)
where Xn[k] = [∆x[k]T , ∆z[k]T ]T ∈ Ra+M ; and Φn(∆t) and Cn(∆t) are
defined as
Φn(∆t) =
[
Φ1 Γ1
A10 B5
]
, Cn(∆t) =
[
Γ2∆p[k]
C3∆p[k]
]
.
3.2.4 Stability
Given that C(∆t) is bounded, the stability of the system in (3.7) can be
determined by the eigenvalues of Φn(∆t) [74]. The system is stable when the
largest eigenvalue magnitude is less than 1, otherwise, the system will diverge
under any disturbance. Note that as discussed in Section 3.2.2, the matrix B5
in Φn(∆t) can be approximated by B2 = (1−∆t)IM , where IM is an identity
matrix of size M . Therefore, although the open-loop system without AGC
is stable, meaning that the magnitudes of all eigenvalues of Φ1 are less than
1, a relatively large ∆t may lead the largest eigenvalue magnitude of Φn(∆t)
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to be larger than 1. Also, since it is determined by B5, the largest eigenvalue
magnitude of Φn(∆t) should be monotonic with respect to ∆t. This will be
illustrated in Section 3.4.
3.3 Assessing the Impact of Communication Delays
In this section, an augmented discrete-time model is formulated taking into
account the delay in communication channels. Then, by using the augmented
discrete-time model in (3.7), we analyze the impact on the system stability
of both deterministic and random communication delays.
3.3.1 Deterministic Communication Delay
In (3.5), assume that the sample interval ∆t is constant. For k ∈ Z+, at
time k∆t, the frequency and generator outputs are measured and transmit-
ted from the local measurement devices to the control center; let d1 denote
the time delay during this process. After the AGC system receives the mea-
surements, it will calculate the new generator set point u[k], and send u[k] to
the generators participating in AGC; let d2 denote the corresponding com-
munication delay time. Assume that the measuring time and computing time
are negligible comparing to the communication delay. The command will be
received by generators at time k∆t + d1 + d2, meaning that the total time
delay is d = d1 + d2. Until this new command arrives, the generators use the
previous set point value u[k − 1]. Assume that d ≤ ∆t, then the set point
values u(t) used by the generators are
u(t) =
u[k − 1], k∆t ≤ t < k∆t+ d,u[k], k∆t+ d ≤ t < (k + 1)∆t. (3.8)
3.3.1.1 Discretization
Given (3.8), the commands passed to the generators are no longer constant
during each time interval [k∆t, (k + 1)∆t]. We partition this interval into
two parts: [k∆t, k∆t + d] and [k∆t + d, (k + 1)∆t], and discrete (3.5a) over
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each of these two intervals:
∆x(k∆t+ d) =Φ2∆x(k∆t) + Γ3∆z[k − 1]
+ Γ4∆p(k∆t), k∆t ≤ t ≤ k∆t+ d (3.9a)
∆x((k + 1)∆t) =Φ3∆x(k∆t+ d) + Γ5∆z[k]
+ Γ6∆p(k∆t+ d), k∆t+ d ≤ t ≤ (k + 1)∆t, (3.9b)
where
Φ2 = e
A9d, Φ3 = e
A9(∆t−d),
Γ3 =
ˆ d
0
eA9sdsB4, Γ4 =
ˆ d
0
eA9sdsC2,
Γ5 =
ˆ ∆t−d
0
eA9sdsB4, Γ6 =
ˆ ∆t−d
0
eA9sdsC2.
Substituting (3.9a) into (3.9b), and assuming that the disturbance is constant
during one sample interval, we obtain that
∆x[k + 1] = Φ1∆x[k] + Γ5∆z[k] + Γ7∆z[k − 1] + Γ2∆p[k],
where
Φ1 = e
A9∆t, Γ5 = A
−1
9 [e
A9(∆t−d) − I]B4,
Γ7 = A
−1
9 [e
A9∆t − eA9(∆t−d)]B4, Γ2 = A−19 [eA9∆t − I]C2.
Define X[k] = [∆x[k]T ,∆z[k]T ,∆z[k − 1]T ]T ; then, we have that
X[k + 1] = Φ(∆t, d)X[k] + C, (3.10)
where
Φ(∆t, d) =
 Φ1 Γ5 Γ7A10 B2 0
0 IM×M 0
 , C =
 Γ2∆p[k]C3∆p[k]
0
 .
Note that Φ is function of ∆t and d. For an ideal communication network
(i.e., d = 0), Γ7 = 0. Then, the model in (3.10) is reduced to the model in
(3.7).
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3.3.1.2 Stability
Since the time delay d is assumed to be deterministic for now, Φ(∆t, d) is also
deterministic. The stability of this system is determined by the largest mag-
nitude of the eigenvalues of Φ(∆t, d). Note that although the sample interval
∆t is properly designed to make the system in (3.7) stable, certain communi-
cation delays can cause the system in (3.10) to become unstable. Moreover,
unlike the monotonic relationship between ∆t and the largest eigenvalue mag-
nitude, the relationship between the time delay d and the largest eigenvalue
magnitude is nonmonotonic. Thus, an increase in the communication delay
may help mitigate the instability of the system. Similar findings have been
presented in [43], where the authors analyzed the impact of the communica-
tion delay on the performance of electrical markets; this phenomenon will be
illustrated in Section 3.4.
3.3.2 Random Communication Delay
In reality, communication delays may vary at each instant k∆t. Due to
the large number of factors that affect the communication delay, including
various waiting time depending on the network traffic, and retransmission
due to transmission errors, it is reasonable to model the delays as normally
distributed random variables. As in [41], we also assume independence on
the communication delays across time; therefore, by taking expectations on
both sides of (3.10), we obtain
E[X[k + 1]] = E[Φ(∆t, d)]E[X[k]] + E[C], (3.11)
where E[C] is bounded.
3.3.2.1 Stability
If the largest eigenvalue magnitude of E[Φ(∆t, d)] is larger than 1, E[X[k]] will
diverge with k. However, even if the largest eigenvalue magnitude is less than
1, this does not necessarily guarantees that the system is stable almost surely.
Note that during the calculation of E[Φ(∆t, d)], the exponential function of
a normal random variable appears; this expectation can be evaluated by
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utilizing the moment generating function of a normal distribution.
For a random process, mean square stability implies almost sure stabil-
ity [41]. Therefore, in order to investigate the system stability, we examine
the dynamics of the state second moment, which is described by
E[X[k + 1]X[k + 1]T ] =E[(ΦX[k] + C)(ΦX[k] + C)T ]
=E[ΦX[k]X[k]TΦT ] + E[Φ]E[X[k]]E[CT ]
+ E[C]E[X[k]T ]E[ΦT ] + E[CCT ]. (3.12)
One way to analyze the stability of the system in (3.12) is to collect the first
and second moments into an augmented vector. To this end, define P [k] =
[E[X[k]X[k]T ], E[X[k]]], and convert P [k] into a column vector. Then, we
obtain that
vec(P [k + 1]) = G1vec(P [k]) +G2,
where G1 and G2 can be determined from (3.11) and (3.12). However, in
this case, G1 contains the elements of the vector C, which are unknown but
bounded. Therefore, the eigenvalues of matrix G1 will be underdetermined.
This underdetermination can be circumvented by considering the mean and
the second moments separately; this idea is captured in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. For the system
X[k + 1] = ΦX[k] + C,
where C is bounded, second moment stability can be determined by the largest
eigenvalue magnitude of E[Φ⊗ Φ], where ⊗ indicates Kronecker products.
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. The first part is to show that if
E[Φ⊗Φ] is Schur (i.e., all its eigenvalues’ magnitudes are less than one), then
E[Φ] is Schur. Note that this is not trivial and cannot be explicitly proven by
directly applying the spectrum property of the Kronecker product (i.e., the
eigenvalues of a matrix squared are equal to the squares of the eigenvalues of
this matrix [8, 41]), because E[Φ⊗Φ] is not equal to E[Φ]⊗ E[Φ]. However,
we can prove this by examining a special case where C = 0. In this case,
convert the second moment matrix into a column vector. Then, the second
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moment evolves according to
vec(E[X[k + 1]X[k + 1]T ]) = E[Φ⊗ Φ]vec(E[X[k]X[k]T ]).
If E[Φ ⊗ Φ] is Schur, then this system is second-moment stable, and subse-
quentally almost surely stable. Therefore, the mean converges as well. On
the other side, because the mean evolves according to
E[X[k + 1]] = E[Φ]E[X[k]],
then, E[Φ] has to be Schur so that the mean converges.
In the second part, we consider the general case where C is not equal to
zero, but bounded. Let
G3 :=E[Φ]E[X[k]]E[CT ] + E[C]E[X[k]T ]E[ΦT ] + E[CCT ].
Then, the mean and the second moment evolve according to
E[X[k + 1]] = E[Φ]E[X[k]] + E[C], (3.13a)
vec(E[X[k + 1]X[k + 1]T ]) = E[Φ⊗ Φ]vec(E[X[k]X[k]T ]) + vec(G3).
(3.13b)
Because E[Φ] is Schur and E[C] is bounded, then, from (3.13a), we conclude
that E[X[k]] is bounded. Then, we obtain that G3 is bounded as well. Given
(3.13b), E[Φ ⊗ Φ] being Schur can guarantee the convergence of the second
moment. 
By using Lemma 2, it is straightforward to show that the almost sure
stability of the system in (3.10) can be determined by the largest eigenvalue
magnitude of E[Φ⊗ Φ].
3.4 Case Studies
In this section, we illustrate the proposed analysis framework with a 4-bus
system. Two synchronous generators, one renewable generation unit and
one load comprise this power system model. A complete list of the model
parameters, including those of the AGC system, can be found in [52, 21].
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Figure 3.1: Eigenvalues vs. sample interval.
The electromechanical behavior of each synchronous machine is described by
a third-order model (see e.g., [65]). Since one of the rotor angles is chosen
as reference, we have that x(t) ∈ R5. The disturbance to the dynamics
is introduced by varying the load. The AGC signal is sampled every two
seconds.
First, as discussed in Section 3.2.4, Fig. 3.1 illustrates the monotonic rela-
tionship between the sample intervals and the largest eigenvalue magnitudes.
This figure also illustrates that although the original system with AGC is
stable, large AGC sample interval may cause system instability. Next, we
investigate the impact of deterministic communication delays. Figure 3.2 de-
picts the largest eigenvalue magnitudes as we vary the communication delay.
For a certain range, the largest eigenvalue magnitude decreases as the delay
is increased. The system is stable until the delay is larger than 1.70 s. Fig-
ure 3.3, which presents one generator’s rotor speed, verifies that the system
is still stable when the delay is 1.70 s. Simulations with both linear and non-
linear models are conducted, and the good matching of the results verifies
the effectiveness of the linear model.
Next, we investigate the impact of random delays. First, we assume that
the random delay has a mean of 0.2 s. Figure 3.4(a) depicts the largest eigen-
value magnitude as we vary the variance, from which we can observe that
the system is robust to variance variation when the delay is relatively small.
However, when the delay has a relatively large mean, the system stability is
less robust to variance variation. For instance, we consider the case when
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Figure 3.2: Eigenvalues vs. communication delays.
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Figure 3.3: Simulation with 1.7 s deterministic delay.
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(a) Eigenvalue vs. variance with a mean of 0.2 s.
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(b) Eigenvalue vs. variance with a mean of 1.60 s.
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(c) Eigenvalue vs. variance with a mean of 1.70 s.
Figure 3.4: Eigenvalue vs. variance.
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Figure 3.5: Simulation at 1.7 s delay with 0.02 s2 variance.
the mean of delay is 1.60 s, which corresponds to the lowest largest eigen-
value magnitude in Fig. 3.2 with deterministic delays. However, Fig. 3.4(b)
demonstrates that the system tends to be unstable with very small variance.
An extreme case is when the mean of the delay is 1.7 s, with which the
system is stable if the variance is zero. Figure 3.4(c) shows that the system
becomes unstable with a variance of 0.02 s2. The simulation results, as
presented in Fig. 3.5, confirm that the system diverges when the delay has
a mean of 1.7 s and a variance of 0.02 s2; the rotor speed deviation achieves
unrealistic values in 60 s.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter proposed a framework to investigate the impact of communi-
cation delays on power system AGC performance. With this framework,
we can determine whether the delay in the communication network, caused
due to network traffic or malicious attacks, remain within acceptable ranges
to maintain system stability. We achieve this by modeling the system dy-
namics with AGC algorithm as a hybrid system, converting it to a linear
discrete-time system, and examining the eigenvalues of the system matrix.
Particularly, when the delay is assumed to be random, we proposed a stability
criterion for the resulting random system with nonzero mean disturbance.
We illustrate this methodology in several case studies. Insightful observa-
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tions include that the largest eigenvalue magnitude of the system matrix may
be decreased as the deterministic communication delay increases. However,
although large deterministic delay may help improve the system stability,
small variance on the delay may cause system instability.
This framework is also applicable to other cyber-physical systems, such
as distributed control system. This framework can also be generalized to
cases where multiple measurements and commands are transmitted through
multiple communication channels with different delays, and the delays may
be modeled as a Markov chain.
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CHAPTER 4
POWER SYSTEM WITH AGC
SIMULATION TOOLBOX: ENABLING
CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY STUDIES
In this chapter, we present an open-source automatic generation control
(AGC) simulation package, built upon a power system dynamic simulation
toolbox called power system toolbox (PST). Our package also provides a
linearized model for AGC-enabled power systems by utilizing sensitivity ma-
trices provided by PST. This linearized model can be used for further small-
signal stability analysis. The simulation package also includes a graphical
user interface (GUI) for cyber security studies. It allows users to add various
measurement errors and communication delays to signals that are used in
AGC systems. This function has been extensively used in the case studies
in Chapters 2 and 3. In this chapter, we also present several case studies to
illustrate sample applications of this package.
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, for both power system performance analysis and
AGC algorithm design, the AGC dynamics cannot be isolated with the dy-
namics of other system components (e.g., generators and loads) any more.
System dynamic simulations that include a comprehensive model are neces-
sary. Although there are a few customized software tools to simulate system
dynamics that include AGC per the request of customers, e.g., independent
system operators, most of commercial power system simulation tools do not.
For instance, although PowerWorld is able to set generators to participate in
AGC in steady-state simulation, AGC is not included in its dynamic analy-
sis. Neither is PSS R©E capable of performing AGC dynamic simulations. In
order to achieve that, specific modules have to be written by users [75].
In this chapter, we present an AGC simulation package built on the Power
System Toolbox (PST) [70], a flexible MATLAB-based simulation tool. The
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capabilities of this package include that: (i) the dynamics of a power system
with AGC can be simulated by a comprehensive nonlinear model including
AGC dynamics, turbine-governor control, excitor control, generator dynam-
ics, etc; and (ii) the corresponding linearized model can also be obtained
so that small-signal stability analysis can be easily conducted. Major ad-
vantages of this open-source MATLAB package, inherited from MATLAB
programming language, include the full access to system state variables and
the ease of implementing different AGC scenarios. Therefore, it can be easily
utilized to perform various power system AGC studies.
The second part of this package is to utilize aforementioned AGC dynamic
simulation functionality to study the impact of security issues on system
performance, as cyber-physical security has been identified as the one of the
priority areas in new-generation power systems [76]. As a centralized control
system, the measurements and commands used in AGC have to be transmit-
ted between the control center and generators over a communication network.
Thus, the AGC system will be inevitably affected by cyber events, such as
network traffics or cyber attacks. In our package, a graphical user interface
(GUI) is provided for users to easily impose different kinds of measurement
noise/errors and communication delays to signals used in AGC systems, and
simulate the impact.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 gives a
brief overview of the power system dynamics with AGC. Section 4.3 describes
the implementation of AGC in PST. And a graphical user interface (GUI)
designed to easily run simulations and to compromise the measurements used
in AGC for cyber security studies is developed and presented in Section 4.4.
Validation and two application cases are illustrated in Section 4.5. Conclud-
ing remarks are made in Section 4.6.
4.2 Power System Dynamics with AGC
In this section, we first adopt the notation and the mathematical model
described in Chapter 1 to simulate the system dynamics with AGC. It is
described by a set of differential-algebraic equations (DAEs). The model is
also linearized to obtain a linear model, which can be used for small-signal
analysis.
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4.2.1 Nonlinear Model
Since this package is implemented based on PST, all the component models
that are available in PST, including different generator models, excitation
system models, power system stabilizer models, turbine-governor models,
and load modulation models, are captured in this package as well, and can
be simulated according to the case settings. The details about different
component models can be found in [77]. We adopt the notation and model
described in Chapter 1 and rewrite the power system dynamic model in (1.1)
here.
x˙ = f(x, y, u), (4.1a)
0 = g(x, y, p), (4.1b)
The AGC system model as described in (4.2) is also re-presented here.
z˙ = h1(γ
meas, z), (4.2a)
u = k(z). (4.2b)
As discussed in Chapter 2, the measurement variable vector γmeas(t) is func-
tion of the system dynamic state variable vector x(t) and algebraic state
variable vector y(t). Then, the AGC system model can be described as fol-
lows:
z˙ = h3(x, y, z), (4.3a)
u = k(z). (4.3b)
4.2.2 Linearized Model
Assume the power system with AGC in (4.1) and (4.3) evolves toward an
equilibrium point (x∗, y∗, z∗, u∗) under a load profile p∗. With the change in
load profile ∆p(t) = p(t)− p∗, the system state variable trajectories become
x(t) = x∗ + ∆x(t), y(t) = y∗ + ∆y(t) z(t) = z∗ + ∆z(t), and u(t) = u∗ +
∆u(t). Note that for notational convenience, we drop the dependence on t in
subsequent developments. For sufficiently small variations, linearizing (4.1)
and (4.3) around (x∗, y∗, z∗, u∗), we obtain a linearized model described by a
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set of linear equations of the form
∆x˙ = A1∆x+ A2∆y +B1∆u, (4.4)
0 = A3∆x+ A4∆y + C1∆p, (4.5)
∆z˙ = A5∆x+ A6∆y +B2∆z, (4.6)
∆u = B3∆z, (4.7)
where the matrices A1−A6, B1−B3 and C1 are evaluated at the equilibrium
point as the partial derivatives of the functions f, g, h3, and k.
Assume that the invertability of matrix A4 always holds, by plugging ∆y
and ∆u into (4.4) and (4.5), we have
∆x˙ = Al1∆x+B
l
1∆z + C
l
1∆p (4.8a)
∆z˙ = Al2∆x+B
l
2∆z + C
l
2∆p, (4.8b)
where
Al1 = A1 − A2A−14 A3, Bl1 = B1B3, C l1 = −A2A−14 C1,
Al2 = A5 − A6A−14 A3, Bl2 = B2, C l2 = −A6A−14 C1.
We claim that the linear model in (4.7)-(4.8) is useful for small signal
stability evaluation and analysis, although there are two issues that need
to be considered. First, for certain operating points, if constraints or hard
limits of the states of some electric components (e.g., exciters, and governors)
are hit; then (4.1) and (4.3) are not differentiable. However, this has been
addressed in the PST by numerically calculating the Jacobian matrix by
applying a small perturbation to each state variable, rather than analytically
differentiating the corresponding functions. Second, the AGC is implemented
in a discrete-time fashion with a relatively large time step by appropriately
discretizing the continuous-time representation in (4.3), rather than in a
continuous way as presented above. However, we will show in Section 4.5
that although large AGC time steps will slow the process, the system stability
characteristics are preserved.
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4.3 AGC Implementation in PST
The power system toolbox (PST) describes the dynamics of power system
components, including different generator models, excitation system models,
power system stabilizer models, turbine-governor models, and load modu-
lation models, by a set of differential equations, and describes the power
system network by a set of algebraic equations. It allows users to simulate
the behavior of power system dynamics, and also to obtain a linear model
for small-signal analysis. In this section, we present the procedure of imple-
menting AGC based on PST, as well as obtaining the matrices in the linear
model of power systems with AGC, as defined in (4.8).
4.3.1 AGC Implementation
The PST provides a function called “mtg_sig” to modulate the governor
set point values during simulation. The modulation signals are defined in a
matrix called “tg_sig” and passed as a global variable. As to implementation,
it is worth noting that according to the PST setup, the modulation signals
are not exactly the governor set point values, but the difference between the
set point values determined by AGC and the scheduled generation values
(e.g., determined by economic dispatch). Therefore, without AGC, “tg_sig”
is set to zero by default.
To implement AGC, function “mtg_sig” is coded to take the measurements
of system frequency and the power flow on the tie lines, and to perform
the calculation as described in (3.2) and (1.3). Then, the set points for
participating generators are calculated based on their participation factors.
The set points, after subtracting the scheduled generation values, are assigned
to the modulation signal “tg_sig”. Note that we use the average of the
generator’s machine speeds as the approximate of the system frequency. Also
note that since the power bases for the system and generators are different,
the set point values have to be properly scaled in order to get the correct
values to feed into the generator governors. Finally, we comment on the
time step of the AGC system. Typically, the AGC signals are sent out to
the generators every 2 to 4 seconds. Therefore, we set the AGC time step
as a parameter in our toolbox, which the user can define in the case files.
Then, the value of “tg_sig” is recalculated according to this AGC time step
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parameter (e.g., every 2 seconds) rather than the system simulation time
step. The value of “tg_sig” is kept constant in between times.
4.3.2 Linearized Model
The PST possesses the capability to linearize a comprehensive nonlinear
power system model at the equilibrium point to provide a linear dynamic
model of the form:
∆x˙ = APST1 ∆x+B
PST
1 ∆u+ C
PST
1 ∆p (4.9a)
∆v = DPST1 ∆x+D
PST
2 ∆u+D
PST
3 ∆p (4.9b)
with no AGC considered. The ∆v denotes the variation on the measurement
variables used in AGC, i.e., the generator output and the power flow on the
line ties. The superscript PST indicate that these matrices can be obtained
by running PST. The details regarding how to calculate these matrices can
be found in the description of the driver function “svm_mgen” in [77]. Note
that the sensitivity matrix of generator’s electrical output (in per unit) with
respect to system state is on each generator base. Therefore, it has to be
scaled properly when used in the following ACE calculation.
With AGC implemented, one way to obtain the linearized model is to
fully modify the PST source code to re-evaluate the Jacobian matrix in the
comprehensive nonlinear system model with AGC. Here, we perform another
method to make use of the relationship (4.9). To this end, we rewrite the
AGC evolution equation (4.6) as
∆z˙ = A10∆x+ A11∆v +B2∆z, (4.10)
where the entries of A10, A11 and B2 can be determined by combining (3.2)
and (1.3) straightforwardly.
Putting (4.9), (4.10), and (4.7) together, we obtain the linear dynamic
model as defined in (4.8), and the matrices are calculated as
Al1 = A
PST
1 , A
l
2 = A10 + A11D
PST
1 ,
Bl1 = B
PST
1 B3, B
l
2 = A11D
PST
2 B3 +B2,
C l1 = C
PST
1 , C
l
2 = A11D
PST
3 .
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4.4 Graphical User Interface and Applications in
Cyber Security
This package also provides a graphical user interface (GUI) for users to easily
run simulations. The control panel is shown in Fig. 4.1. After the user selects
the case file and checks the AGC-ON box in the first row, the simulation
results upon the user’s request (e.g., frequency, and voltage magnitudes and
angles at certain buses) will be displayed. The user can also choose among
nonlinear and linearized models as presented in Section 4.3.
One of the main applications of this toolbox in our studies is to facilitate
the cyber security impact analysis. This GUI provides an interface to directly
compromise the measurements used in AGC, and evaluate the corresponding
effects. Both deterministic and random measurement errors can be added.
The error parameters can be determined either by adjusting the first slider
or by directly entering the parameter value in the textbox under the slider.
Similarly, the communication delay can be introduced through the second
slider or the textbox under it.
4.5 Case Studies
In this section, we first demonstrate the simulation and linearization capa-
bilities of this toolbox using a 68-bus 16-machine system, which is a reduced
order model of the New England/New York interconnected power system.
Its one-line diagram and detailed description can be found in [78]. The pa-
rameter values are defined in a data file, which is part of the PST suite [77].
To implement AGC, extra data field to define the BA area topology, and
AGC parameters (e.g., bias factors, participation factors, scheduled power
interchange values) are added in the data file. In this case, we assume that
there are two BA areas, and the tie lines are Line 1-2, 1-27, and 9-8, accord-
ing to the one-line diagram in [78]. The scheduled power interchange value
is assumed to be the value determined in the initial steady-state condition.
Note that in the first two simulations, we set the AGC time step equal to
the simulation time step in order to illustrate the accuracy of the linearized
model. However, we understand that this is not practical; therefore, in the
following studies, we investigate the impact of relatively larger AGC time
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steps. Then, using the same dataset, we present an illustrative example of
the cyber security studies.
4.5.1 Nonlinear Model Validation
First, to validate the effectiveness of AGC, we arbitrarily change the load at
bus 4, 8, 37, 41, 42, and 52 by increasing 0.1 p.u. The frequency deviation
at each generator is depicted in Fig. 4.2(a) with red (dashed) plots. Then,
after activating the AGC described in Section 4.3.1, the frequency at each
generator is also depicted in Fig. 4.2(a) by blue (solid) lines, from which we
can observe that the AGC restores the system frequency back to nominal
frequency. The power interchange values from one area to the other with
Figure 4.1: AGC simulation package interface.
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and without AGC are depicted in Fig. 4.2(b), where we can see that the
AGC works as expected to bring the power exchange back to its scheduled
value.
4.5.2 Linearized Model Validation
With the same dataset, we obtained the linearized model as described in
Section 4.3.2. In order to verify its correctness, we plot the approximate fre-
quency deviation of each generator using the linearized model in Fig. 4.2(a),
and the approximate power interchange in Fig. 4.2(b) with green (dash-dot)
lines, which agree closely with the trajectories obtained using the full non-
linear model.
4.5.3 Impact of AGC Time Steps
It is worth noting that although there is a large amount of research based on
the continuous model defined in (4.3) (including the aforementioned small
signal analysis), currently the AGC signals are dispatched to the governors
at discrete time interval of 2 to 4 seconds to adjust the set points. There is
a gap of examining that the results derived from continuous time models are
still valid in the discrete-time implementation.
Originally, we implement the AGC system as described in (4.3) with the
AGC time step equal to the simulation time step (i.e., 0.005 second), as
shown by the blue (solid) lines in Fig. 4.3(a). Here we change the AGC time
step to 2 seconds, and the resulting frequency deviation at each bus is plotted
in Fig. 4.3(a) in red (dashed) lines. Similarly, the sum of set points to all
the governors with continuous and discrete time intervals are displayed in
Fig. 4.3(b) by blue (solid) and red (dashed) lines respectively. From these
two figures, we can observe that the convergence preserves with both time
intervals, except that the system converges slower with a 2-second time step.
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Figure 4.2: System performance with and without AGC.
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Figure 4.3: System performance with discrete AGC signals.
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4.5.4 Cyber Security Studies
As an illustrative example, we investigate the impact of measurement noise
on the system performance. White noise is added to measurements (i.e.,
the frequency measurements in this case). The frequency trajectories at
bus 1 obtained using the nonlinear model and linearized model are plotted in
Fig. 4.4 in blue (solid) and red (dashed) lines respectively. First, the closeness
of the trajectories from both models validated the linearization capability of
this simulation package. Moreover, the results indicate that the AGC system
is generally robust to white noise. Further analysis on the impact of different
types of measurement errors and delays on the system performance has been
studied in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
The open-source AGC simulation toolbox developed in this chapter can sim-
ulate the power system dynamics with a comprehensive nonlinear model
including system network, generator dynamics, excitation control, turbine-
governor response, power system stabilizer, AGC, etc. This toolbox also
provides a linearized model for further small-signal stability analysis and de-
sign. These capabilities have been validated with a two-area test case. This
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toolbox can facilitate AGC system simulation, analysis, and design for large-
scale power systems. As an example, building on this functionality, a GUI
that facilitates cyber-physical security studies is developed and also included
in this package. It allows users to easily impose errors and delays on the
measurements used in AGC, and simulate the impact.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPACT OF CYBER-PHYSICAL
UNCERTAINTY ON DEMAND RESPONSE
RESOURCE AGGREGATION SYSTEMS
Demand response resources (DRRs) are usually aggregated in order to par-
ticipate in wholesale electricity markets. In such DRR aggregation systems,
uncertainty arising from, e.g., random failures, is unavoidable. This chapter
focuses on assessing the impact of uncertain phenomena on the reliability of
DRR aggregation systems. To this end, we first develop a stochastic hybrid
system (SHS) model to capture DRR continuous dynamics, as well as dis-
crete events that arise from failures and repairs. The statistics of the DRR
aggregation system state variables can be obtained by using the extended
generator of the SHS. Then, we can use these statistics to estimate the value
of the probability that the DRR aggregation system can successfully provide
a certain amount of power for a period of time. The proposed method is
illustrated through several examples and case studies.
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on studying demand response program in which
consumers are able to adjust their consumption accordingly when the grid
supply-demand mismatch is severe, or grid reliability is in jeopardy; these
consumers are referred to as demand response resources (DRRs) [11]. As
mentioned in Chapter 1, common examples of DRRs include residential and
commercial loads with the ability to store thermal energy (e.g., residential
thermostatically controlled loads, and commercial building HVAC systems),
and other interruptible loads (e.g., certain industrial consumers). Typically,
in order for these DRRs to participate in a demand response program, an
aggregator that coordinates their response and bids into the wholesale market
is required; we refer to a collection of DRR units coordinated by an aggregator
as a DRR aggregation system.
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DRRs with the ability to store thermal energy possess battery-like charac-
teristics, including constraints on the amount of energy stored; this makes the
capacity of DRR aggregation systems vary with different durations of service,
the relationship of which can be depicted by a capacity-duration curve. In
this chapter, we focus on DRR aggregation systems consisting of this type of
DRRs, and propose a method to obtain this capacity-duration curve taking
random failures in the DRR units into consideration. To this end, in order
to describe the dynamics of each individual DRR unit, we adopt the virtual
battery model in [47]—a set of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) with
constraints on state and input. Note that if the DRR aggregation system
includes other types of DRRs, basic convolution operations can be applied
to evaluate the capacity of the overall DRR aggregation systems; this will be
described in Section 5.4.
For the DRR aggregation system to follow a regulation signal provided
by an ISO, a control algorithm is needed to allocate the commanded power
among its participants. In this work, we first propose a “fair” control algo-
rithm that make the participant units reach their energy limits at the same
time. It will be shown in Section 5.2 that this control algorithm reduces
the computation complexity (e.g., the number of state variables, as well as
the computation time). It will also be shown that the capacity evaluation
of a DRR aggregation system does not significantly depend on the control
algorithm.
In order to capture the effect of random failures on the DRR aggregation
system described above, we develop a stochastic hybrid system (SHS) model
(see Chapter 1). The rates at which the DRR units fail are assumed to be
known, and can be either obtained from empirical data or statistically esti-
mated using historical data. The dynamic state variables from the virtual
battery model become stochastic, and by using the extended generator of
the SHS, we can obtain a set of ODEs that govern the evolution of the state
variable moments (see, e.g., [55], [79], [29]). Then, we can compute the prob-
ability that the DRR aggregation system can successfully provide a certain
amount of power for a period of time—this probability is the reliability mea-
sure we adopt. Then, by varying the value of the power to be provided and
the period duration, we can construct a probability-capacity-duration con-
tour. By setting this probability to a desired confidence level, we can obtain
a capacity-duration curve.
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Figure 5.1: DRR aggregation architecture.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents
the DRR aggregation model adopted in this work. Section 5.3 describes the
proposed reliability assessment method. Discussions on the generalization of
this method are presented in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 illustrates the assess-
ment method via several case studies. Concluding remarks are presented in
Section 5.6.
5.2 Modeling Framework
In this section, we present the DRR aggregation system model, including the
dynamics of individual DRR units, and a control scheme that we propose to
coordinate the response of the DRRs. Then, based on this model, we present
an SHS-based framework to capture the effect of failures and repairs.
5.2.1 Deterministic DRR Aggregation System Model
Consider an aggregator that coordinates N DRR units, as shown in Fig. 5.1.
The aggregator receives from the ISO a regulation signal, r(t), to be followed.
The aggregator also measures the state of each unit i, xi(t) (to be described
in Section 5.2.1.1 ), and determines the power reduction (or increase) from
the baseline power of each unit i, ui(t). The dynamic model for individual
units and the control algorithm to determine the power reduction amount of
each unit are described next.
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5.2.1.1 DRR Unit Dynamics
Let xi(t) ∈ R denote the state variable of DRR unit i, and ui(t) denote the
commanded power reduction (or increase) from the baseline power consump-
tion profile. The dynamics of individual DRR units are described by the
virtual battery model proposed in [47], [46]:
x˙i(t) = −aixi(t)− ui(t), i = 1, · · · , N, (5.1)
−Ci ≤ xi(t) ≤ Ci, −ni ≤ u(t) ≤ n¯i, (5.2)
where the value of the state xi(t) is analogous to the state-of-charge of a
battery; ai > 0 is a constant representing the dissipation rate; and Ci > 0,
ni > 0, n¯i > 0 are constants respectively representing the energy capacity,
lower power limit, and upper power limit. Note that although not common,
ui(t) can be negative so as to capture the case in which the unit increases
its consumption as commanded. In the remainder, we will focus on the
power-reduction case (i.e., ui(t) > 0); the same procedure applies for the
power-increase case.
5.2.1.2 Control
Let r(t) be the amount of power regulation that the DRR aggregation system
needs to follow. Assume that the unit state variables i.e., the xi(t)’s are
measured and available to the aggregator. The power reduction command
for each unit is determined as
ui(t) =
Ci∑
j Cj
r(t) +
Ci
∑N
j=1 ajxj(t)∑N
j=1Cj
− aixi(t). (5.3)
Then, we have that
∑N
i=1 ui(t) = r(t), and
x˙i(t) = −aixi(t)− ui(t) = − Ci∑N
j=1Cj
(r(t) +
N∑
j=1
ajxj(t)). (5.4)
76
Table 5.1: Parameters of DRR units in Example 3.
a1 [h−1] a2 [h−1] C1 [kWh] C2 [kWh]
0.36 0.72 20 30
α1 [h−1] α2 [h−1] β1 [h−1] β2 [h−1]
0.5 0.7 6 3
By dividing Ci on both sides of (5.4), we can show that the variable xi(t)Ci
evolves according to the same dynamic equation for i = 1, · · · , N :
z˙(t) = − r(t)∑N
j=1Cj
−
∑N
j=1 ajCj∑N
j=1Cj
z(t),
where z(t) := xi(t)
Ci
. The constraints on z(t) are −1 ≤ z(t) ≤ 1; thus, we refer
to z(t) as the normalized state variable.
The control algorithm in (5.3) is a “fair” allocation mechanism in the sense
that participant units reach their energy limit at the same time; moreover,
the “state-of-charge” variables are proportional to their energy limits at all
times, i.e., xi(t)
Ci
=
xj(t)
Cj
, t ∈ R+, ∀i, j. This control algorithm also reduces
the original N -th-order model to a first-order model; we will show that this
will significantly reduce the computation complexity. Moreover, we will show
that the capacity assessment results do not depend on the control algorithm
under some reasonable assumptions. Also note that since this work focuses
on the capacity characteristics of DRR aggregation systems, we set r(t) to
be constant and drop the dependence on t in subsequent developments.
Example 3. Consider a DRR aggregation system with two DRR units, the
parameters of which are listed in Table 5.1. From (5.3), we have that
u1(t) = 0.4r − 0.216x1(t) + 0.288x2(t),
u2(t) = 0.6r + 0.216x1(t)− 0.288x2(t).
Then, the evolution of the unit state variables is as follows:
x˙1(t) = −0.144x1(t)− 0.288x2(t)− 0.4r,
x˙2(t) = −0.216x1(t)− 0.432x2(t)− 0.6r.
Finally, assuming x1(0) = x2(0) = 0, we have that x1(t)C1 =
x2(t)
C2
; then, by
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Figure 5.2: SHS-based model. Although only dispayed for q = 11×N , the
evolution of z(t) is governed by (5.5) for all modes.
defining z(t) := x1(t)
C1
, we obtain
z˙(t) = −0.576z(t)− 0.02r.
Thus, the dynamics of this DRR aggregation system is captured by a first-
order system model. 
5.2.2 SHS-Based DRR Aggregation System Model
Let ηi(t) denote an indicator variable that takes value 1 if unit i is func-
tional at time t, and 0 otherwise. We set Q = {0, 1}N , and define q(t) =
(ηi(t))i=1,··· ,N to indicate the DRR aggregation system mode. Then, the dy-
namics of the DRR aggregation system can be captured by the SHS model
displayed in Fig. 5.2, where the mode is indexed by q ∈ {0, 1}N , and the
default value of the element in q is 1 if not specified. The dynamics of the
normalized variable z in each mode evolves according to:
z˙(t) = − r∑
j ηj(t)Cj
−
∑
j ηj(t)ajCj∑
j ηj(t)Cj
z(t). (5.5)
Consider that unit i fails to respond at rate αi, and it is restored back to
service at rate βi. We neglect the case where two units fail or are restored
back to service at the same time. When unit i fails, the i-th element of
q(t) changes from 1 to 0 and the other elements of q(t) remain unchanged.
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Therefore, the transition rate from mode a ∈ Q to mode b ∈ Q is given by
λab =

αi, if a[i] = 1, b[i] = 0, a[j] = b[j], ∀j 6= i,
βi, if a /∈ F , a[i] = 0, b[i] = 1, a[j] = b[j], ∀j 6= i,
0, otherwise,
(5.6)
where a[i] denotes the i-th element of a. During a transition, z(t) remains
the same, i.e., the transition reset map in this case is
φab(q, z) = (b, z). (5.7)
Note that the modes in which the remaining operational units cannot provide
enough power as requested due to DRR unit power reduction constraints,
i.e.,
∑N
i=1 q[i]n¯i < r, are referred to as “fail” modes. The set of “fail” modes
is denoted by F and can be aggregated into one state (see, e.g., [50]). In
Fig. 5.2, we assume that there are no constraints on the ui’s; therefore, only
the mode for which all the units fail, is the “fail” mode.
Given a regulation signal r, let T (r) denote the time at which z(t) hits the
limit −1, i.e., z(T (r)) = −1; T (r) is a random variable and its probability
distribution will be determined in Section 5.3. We claim that from time
T (r) onward, the system can no longer provide the requested power. To
substantiate this claim, let R(t) denote the set of units that have failed, but
have been repaired before time t. Then, if the failures are permanent (i.e.,
β = 0), R(T (r)) = ∅, meaning that the DRR aggregation system cannot
provide any additional energy. If failures are repairable (i.e., β 6= 0), at
time T (r), there may be some additional energy that the units in R(T (r)) can
still provide; next, we argue that this amount of energy can be neglected.
First, repairable failures (e.g., command signals fail to be transmitted due to
communication package drops) can usually be fixed in a fast manner (e.g., by
resending command signals). Therefore, xj(T (r)) will be very close to −Cj,
∀j ∈ R(T (r)), meaning that the total amount of energy that the DRR units
in the set R(T (r)) can provide at time T (r) is small. Second, the cardinality
of R(T (r)) is usually relatively small as compared to N ; it is then very likely
that
∑
j∈R(T (r)) n¯j is smaller than r, meaning that the system still cannot
provide enough power as requested at T (r).
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Figure 5.3: SHS-based model for a two-unit system.
Example 4. Consider the DRR aggregation system discussed in Example 3;
unit failure and repair rates are listed in Table 5.1. The transition diagram
for the SHS-based model for this system is displayed in Fig. 5.3. When the
aggregator participates in energy and capacity markets, it needs to know how
much power the DRRs can provide with high confidence, as if the submitted
offer is cleared but the DRRs fail to provide the requested power, the aggre-
gator may face a significant fine. One possibility is to use an N − 1 type
criterion, i.e., the aggregator may submit the energy and power information
based on the capability of only one unit, in this case. However, this approach
is too conservative as: (i) the failure rates are relatively small and the like-
lihood that failures occur early in the period in which the DRR aggregation
system is providing service is relatively small; and (ii) even if a failure occurs,
repairs may be initiated. On the other side, if the number of participants in
a DRR aggregation system is large and the failure rate is not negligible, this
approach may become too aggressive. Again, this discussion shows the im-
portance of developing probabilistic models in evaluating the capacity of DRR
aggregation systems. 
5.3 Reliability Assessment
In this section, we apply the SHS analysis method presented in Section 1.2.2
to the DRR aggregation system model in Fig. 5.2. We first obtain the values
of system state moments, based on which we can evaluate the probability that
the aggregation system can successfully follow the power regulation signal r
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for a period of time τ, denoted by P (r, τ). By varying the values of r and τ ,
P (r, τ) forms a probability-capacity-duration contour. Then, by setting this
probability to a desired confidence level, we can obtain the corresponding
capacity-duration curves.
5.3.1 Evolution of State Statistics
Consider the DRR aggregation system SHS-based model described in Fig. 5.2.
Applying the method presented in Section 1.2.2, we can write the test func-
tion and conditional moments as follows:
ψ
(m)
i (q, z) : = δi(q)z
m =
zm, q = i0, q 6= i ,∀i ∈ Q.
µ
(m)
i (t) : = E[ψ
(m)
i (Q(t), Z(t))].
Let Oi := {j ∈ Q : λij 6= 0} denote the set of modes to which transitions
from mode i occur, and let Ii := {j ∈ Q : λji 6= 0} denote the set of modes
from which transitions to modes i occur. Then, we can write the following
set of ODEs that governs the evolution of the µ(m)i ’s:
µ˙
(0)
i =−
∑
j∈Oi
λijµ
(0)
i +
∑
j∈Ii
λjiµ
(0)
j , i /∈ F ;
µ˙
(m)
i =−
mr∑N
k=1 i[k]Ck
µ
(m−1)
i − (
m
∑N
k=1 i[k]akCk∑N
k=1 i[k]Ck
+∑
j∈Oi
λij)µ
(m)
i +
∑
j∈Ii
λjiµ
(m)
j , i /∈ F ,m ≥ 1. (5.8)
Example 5. Consider the two-unit DRR aggregation system discussed in
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Example 1; then, the specific expression for (5.8) is given by
µ˙
(0)
(1,1) =− (α1 + α2)µ
(0)
(1,1) + β1µ
(0)
(0,1) + β2µ
(0)
(1,0),
µ˙
(0)
(0,1) =− (β1 + α2)µ
(0)
(0,1) + α1µ
(0)
(1,1),
µ˙(1,0) =− (β2 + α1)µ(1,0) + α2µ(1,1),
µ˙
(m)
(1,1) =− 0.576mµ
(m−1)
(1,1) − (0.02m+ α1 + α2)µ
(m)
(1,1)
+ β1µ
(m)
(0,1) + β2µ
(m)
(1,0),m > 1,
µ˙
(m)
(0,1) =− 0.72µ
(m−1)
(0,1) − (0.05m+ β1 + α2)µ
(m)
(0,1) + α1µ
(m)
(1,1),
µ˙
(m)
(1,0) =− 0.36µ
(m−1)
(1,0) − (0.033m+ β2 + α1)µ
(m)
(0,1) + α2µ
(m)
(1,1).
This completes the example. 
5.3.2 Reliability Assessment
Define the event E1 that the DRR aggregation system can still meet the
power requirement at time τ , i.e., E1 = {Tr > τ}. Also, define the event
E2 that the system nominal state z is still within constraints, i.e., E2 =
{Z(τ) > −1 ∩ Q(τ) /∈ F}. We argued in Section 5.2 that events E1 and E2
are equivalent; therefore, we have that
P (r, τ) =Pr{Tr > τ} = Pr{Z(τ) > −1 ∩Q(τ) /∈ F}
=
∑
i/∈F
Pr{Z(τ) > −1|Q(τ) = i}Pr{Q(τ) = i}, (5.9)
where Pr{Q(τ) = i} = µ(0)i (τ), and Pr{Z(τ) > −1|Q(τ) = i} can be ap-
proximated by using conditional moments. For example, utilizing Cantelli’s
inequality [80], Pr{Z(τ) > −1|Q(τ) = i} can be lower-bounded using the
conditional first and second moments as follows:
Pr{Z(τ) > −1|Q(τ) = i} > 1− σ
2
i (τ)
σ2i (τ) + (−1− µi(τ))2
, (5.10)
where µi(τ) and σ2i (τ) are the conditional mean and variance of Z(τ) given
Q(τ) = i, which can be obtained as µi(τ) =
µ
(1)
i (τ)
µ
(0)
i (τ)
and σ2i (τ) =
µ
(2)
i (τ)
µ
(0)
i (τ)
−
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[
µ
(1)
i (τ)
µ
(0)
i (τ)
]2, respectively. Alternatively, we have that
Pr{Tr > τ} = Pr{Z(τ) > −1 ∩Q(τ) 6/∈ F} (5.11)
= Pr{Z(τ) > −1|Q(τ) /∈ F}Pr{Q(τ) /∈ F},
where Pr{Q(τ) /∈ F} = ∑i/∈F µ(0)i (τ). Similarly, by utilizing Cantelli’s in-
equality, we have that
Pr{Z(τ) > −1|Q(τ) /∈ F} > 1− σ
2
M¯
(τ)
σ2
M¯
(τ) + (−1− µM¯(τ))2
, (5.12)
where µM¯(τ) and σ2M¯(τ) are the conditional mean and variance of Z(τ)
given Q(τ) 6= M , which can be obtained as µM¯(τ) =
∑M−1
i=1 µ
(1)
i (τ)∑M−1
i=1 µ
(0)
i (τ)
and σ2i =∑M−1
i=1 µ
(2)
i (τ)∑M−1
i=1 µ
(0)
i (τ)
− [
∑M−1
i=1 µ
(1)
i (τ)∑M−1
i=1 µ
(0)
i (τ)
]2, respectively. It will be shown in Section 5.5 that
the bounds on Pr{Tr > τ} obtained using both (5.9) and (5.11) are tight.
By varying the value of r, we can obtain a probability-capacity-duration
contour. Then, by setting the probability value to the desired confidence
level, we can obtain the corresponding capacity-duration curve.
Example 6. Consider again the two-unit system discussed in Example 3.
In Fig. 5.4(a), we show the values of the second moments obtained through
our proposed method and Monte Carlo simulations; as one can see, both
methods yield very similar results. For r = 24 kW, the values of P (r, τ) esti-
mated using our proposed method and Monte Carlo simulations are depicted
in Fig. 5.4(b). By varying the value of r, the probability-capacity-duration
contour shown in Fig. 5.4(c) can be obtained. By setting the probability value
to 0.6, we can obtain the capacity-duration curve shown in Fig. 5.4(d). We
also calculated the capacity-duration curve assuming there are no failures,
which is given by r = a1C1+a2C2
1−e−(a1C1+a2C2)/(C1+C2)τ . The difference between this
curve and the curve with reliability considered represents the impact of fail-
ures on the system capacity. The proposed method approximately takes the
same time to complete as that of executing one Monte Carlo run. There-
fore, the computational time of the proposed method is significantly reduced
compared with the Monte Carlo method that usually requires a considerable
number of runs. 
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Figure 5.4: Two-unit DRR aggregation system.
5.4 Specialization and Generalizations
In this section, we first present a special case where the participant units are
identical; then, the SHS model can be simplified through mode aggregation,
and the transition rates, and statistics evolution ODEs are presented as well.
In the second part, we show that the proposed method is also applicable to
DRR aggregation systems with control mechanisms that are different from
the one proposed in Section 5.2. Next, we show that the assessment method
can be generalized to DRR aggregation systems with both battery-like DRR
units and conventional DRR units.
5.4.1 DRR Aggregation Systems with Identical Participant
Units
As a special case, if all participant units in a DRR aggregation system are
identical, the SHS model can be reduced through mode aggregation, i.e., the
modes with the same number of failed units can be aggregated to be one
mode. We present the reduced SHS-based model in the following.
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Figure 5.5: SHS model for DRR aggregation system with identical units.
5.4.1.1 SHS-Based Model
In the DRR aggregation system SHS-based model, depicted in Fig. 5.5, the
discrete part of the state (i.e., q(t)) captures the failure modes; q(t) = 1
denotes a normal non-faulted mode; q(t) = k (1 < k < M) denotes the mode
where k− 1 units have failed to provide the requested regulation power; and
q = M denotes the mode when more thanM−2 units have failed so that the
remaining operational units cannot provide enough power as requested due
to DRR unit power reduction constraints, i.e., (N −M + 1)n¯ < r. Consider
that the units fail to respond at rate α, and the failure will be repaired at
rate β. Then, the transition rate from mode m to mode n is given by
λmn =

(N −m+ 1)α, n = m+ 1, m = 1, · · · ,M − 1;
(m− 1)β, n = m− 1, m = 2, · · · ,M ;
0, otherwise.
As to the continuous part of the state (i.e., xi(t)), O denotes the set of units
that are continuously operational during the whole time of interest. Thus,
xi(t) stays the same during the transitions, i.e., the transition map is
φmn(xi) = xi, n = m± 1.
Since the xi(t)’s are the same for all units in the set O, we will drop the
subscript i in the remainder for notational convenience.
The evolution of the continuous state variable is described by the DRR
unit model in Section 5.2.1.1 and is summarized as
x˙ = f(q, x, t) = −ax− r
N − q + 1 .
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5.4.1.2 Evolution of State Statistics
Utilizing the method presented in Section 5.3.1, we rewrite the test functions
and occupational moments here:
ψ
(m)
i (q, x) := δi(q)x
m =
xm, q = i0, q 6= i , ∀i ∈ Q.
µ
(m)
i (t) := E[ψ
(m)
i (Q,X)] =E[Xm(t)|Q(t) = i]Pr{Q(t) = i}.
Then, we can explicitly write the following set of ODEs that governs the
evolution of µ(m)i ’s:
µ˙
(0)
1 =− λ12µ(0)1 + λ21µ(0)2 ;
µ˙
(0)
i =λ(i−1)iµ
(0)
i−1 − (λi(i−1) + λ(i+1)i)µ(0)i
+ λ(i+1)iµ
(0)
i+1, 1 < i < M ;
µ˙
(0)
M =λ(M−1)Mµ
(0)
M−1 − λM(M−1)µ(0)M ;
µ˙
(m)
1 =−
mr
N
µ
(m−1)
1 − (a+ λ12)µ(m)1 + λ21µ(m)2 , m ≥ 1;
µ˙
(m)
i =−
mr
N − i+ 1µ
(m−1)
i + λ(i−1)iµ
(m)
i−1 + λ(i+1)iµ
(m)
i+1
− (a+ λi(i−1) + λ(i+1)i)µ(m)i , 1 < i < M,m ≥ 1. (5.13)
Then, the same reliability assessment process can be followed.
5.4.2 DRR Aggregation Systems under Alternative Controls
The proposed method developed so far is based on the control/allocation
algorithm in (5.3); however, we conjecture that the system capacity char-
acteristics do not vary much with other control algorithms. Moreover, we
can prove that if we neglect the dissipation term, i.e., ai = 0 as well as re-
pair events, i.e., βi = 0, and assume that the failure rate is the same for
all participant units, i.e., αi = αj,∀i, j ∈ {1, · · · , N}, the system capacity
characteristics do not depend on the allocation mechanism. The statement
is intuitive for a system with a collection of battery-like DRRs, and no fail-
ures considered. The proof of this statement with αi 6= 0 is provided in the
following.
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Lemma 5.4.1. For the DRR aggregation system described by the SHS model
in (5.5)-(5.7), if ai = 0, βi = 0, and αi = αj, ∀i, j, the system capacity
characteristics do not depend on the allocation mechanism.
Proof. For a given r, let Q(r) indicate the total energy provided by the DRR
aggregation system; then,
T (r) =
Q(r)
r
.
If no failure has occurred, then the total energy is
∑N
i=1 Ci. Let Lj indicate
the energy loss due to the event that the j-th unit in the system fails; then,
we have
Q(r) =
N∑
i=1
Ci −
M∑
k=1
Lk, (5.14)
whereM indicates the total number of failures during the time that the DRR
aggregation system can meet the power regulation request. Next, we show
that Lj is independent of the control algorithm used by the aggregator; there-
fore, the distribution of T (r) is independent of the control algorithm. Take
L1 as an example; the key point is that any control mechanism guarantees
that
∑N
i=1 ui(t) = r . Let p1,i be the probability that unit i is the first unit
that fails. As all the units have the same failure rate, p1,i = 1N . Let T1 be
the time that the first unit fails; then, we have that
L1 =
N∑
i=1
p1,i(Ci −
ˆ T1
0
ui(t)dt)) =
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
Ci −
ˆ T1
0
N∑
i=1
ui(t)dt)
=
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
Ci −
ˆ T1
0
rdt) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ci − r
N
T1,
which is independent of ui(t)’s. Similarly, we have that
L2 =
1
N
N∑
j=1
(
1
n− 1
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
(Ci −
ˆ T1
0
ui(t)dt−
ˆ T2
T1
ui(t)dt))
=
1
N(N − 1)(
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
Ci −
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
ˆ T1
0
N∑
j=1
ui(t)dt
−
N∑
j=1
ˆ T2
T1
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
ui(t)dt
=
1
N
N∑
j=1
Ci − r
N
T1 − r
N − 1(T2 − T1).
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Then, by setting T0 = 0, Lk is given by
Lk =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ci −
k∑
j=1
1
N + 1− j (Tk − Tk−1),
which again is independent of the control algorithm. Therefore, the distributions
of Q(r) and T (r) are independent of the control algorithm. 
Next, we verify it with a two-unit aggregation system example.
Example 7. Consider a two-unit DRR aggregation system. We set ai =
0, βi = 0, and αi = 0.5, i = 1, 2. The other parameters are the same as
those in Example 3. For r = 24 kW, the values of P (r, τ) using the control
algorithm in (5.3) and another control algorithm in which the aggregator
randomly allocates the power regulation among the operational DRR units,
are obtained via Monte Carlo simulations, respectively. The results for both
control algorithms are depicted in Fig. 5.6, where one can see a very close
matching. 
5.4.3 DRR Aggregation Systems with Different Types of DRRs
It is likely that a DRR aggregation system not only includes battery-like
DRR units but also conventional DRR units with no energy limits. Follow-
ing the procedure described in Section 5.3, we can obtain the probability-
capacity-duration contour of the battery-like DRRs in the system. By set-
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Figure 5.7: Probability-duration curve for a 20-unit system.
ting the duration time to a fixed value, τ , we can obtain the corresponding
probability-capacity curve. Denote by R(τ) the maximum power that the
DRR aggregation system can provide for a period of time τ . Then, the
probability-capacity curve is the complementary cumulative function of R(τ),
denoted by FR(τ)(r) := Pr{R(τ) > r}. Denote by D the power that can be
provided by the conventional DRRs, and assume we have the probability
density function of D, denoted by fD(d) := Pr{D = d}. Let S(τ) be the total
power that can be provided by the total DRR aggregation system; then we
have that (see, e.g., [81])
Pr{S(τ) ≥s} = Pr{R(τ) +D ≥ s}
=
ˆ ∞
−∞
fD(v) · FR(τ)(s− v)dv = fD ◦ FR(τ)(s),
where ◦ indicates the convolution operator. For instance, if the conventional
DRR units can provide an amount of power a with probability of p and zero
power with probability of (1−p), we have that fD(d) = pδ(d−a)+(1−p)δ(d),
and
Pr{S(τ) > s} = (1− p)FR(τ)(s) + pFR(τ)(s− a).
Then, by varying the value of τ , we can obtain the probability-capacity-
duration curve for the complete DRR aggregation system.
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Figure 5.8: Capacity-probability-duration contour obtained by Monte Carlo
simulations for a 20-unit system.
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Figure 5.9: Capacity-probability-duration contour obtained by proposed
method for a 20-unit system.
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Figure 5.10: Capacity-duration curve for a 20-unit system.
5.5 Case Studies
In this section, we analyze two DRR aggregation systems with 20 units and
1000 units in order to demonstrate the scalability of the proposed method.
Conservative estimates of P (r, τ) are obtained using (5.9)-(5.12). Monte
Carlo simulations are also conducted to estimate the value of P (r, τ). The
results obtained through both methods are shown to be close; however, the
computational time of our proposed method is much less than that of the
Monte Carlo method. A way to address the explosion of the SHS state-space
dimension when analyzing large DRR aggregation systems is also discussed.
The computation is performed on a PC with a 3.40 GHz Intel Xeon CPU
processor and 8 GB memory in the MATLAB environment.
5.5.1 A DRR Aggregation System with 20 Units
Consider a DRR aggregation system that consists of 20 units. Ten of them
are identical and their parameters are the same as those of unit 1 in Example
3; let A denote the set of these units. The parameters of the other ten units
are the same as those of unit 2 in Example 3; let B denote the set of these
units. Since there are 20 units, there should be 220 discrete modes in the SHS
model. However, since the units in each set are identical, we can aggregate
the modes with same number of operational units in each set as one mode;
then, an SHS model with 121 modes results. Assume there are no constraints
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Figure 5.11: Probability-duration curve for a 20-identical-unit system.
on the ui’s; then only the last mode where no units are functional is a “fail”
mode.
For r = 300 kW, the lower bound on P (r, τ), depicted in Fig. 5.7, can be
obtained using (5.9) and (5.11). Another way to estimate the value of P (r, τ)
is to run 4000 Monte Carlo simulations and calculate the percentage of the
resulting sample paths for which the state variable z(τ) is still within limits at
time τ (i.e., −1 < z(τ) < 1); the result is also depicted in Fig. 5.7. By varying
the value of r, we can obtain the probability-capacity-duration contour shown
in Figs. 5.8 and 5.9, respectively obtained by our proposed method, and by
using Monte Carlo simulations. Then, by setting the probability to a desired
confidence level (for example, 95%), we can obtain the capacity-duration
curve shown in Fig. 5.10. Note that the capacity-duration curve obtained
using the bounds on P (r, τ) closely matches that obtained by Monte Carlo
simulation.
We also calculated the capacity-duration curve assuming there are no fail-
ures, which is given by r = 10a1C1+10a2C2
1−e−(10a1C1+10a2C2)/(10C1+10C2)τ . The difference be-
tween this curve and the curve with failures considered captures the impact
on the system capacity of random failures. Also note that the occupational
probability values of the states, for which large number of units fail, are al-
most zero; thus, we can truncate those states without affecting the results.
For this case, the results obtained with a truncated SHS model having 37
modes are the same as those presented above as the occupational probabili-
ties of the truncated modes are zero during the considered time period.
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Figure 5.12: Capacity-probability-duration contour obtained by Monte
Carlo simulations for a 20-identical-unit system.
Figure 5.13: Capacity-probability-duration contour obtained by proposed
method for a 20-identical-unit system.
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Figure 5.14: Capacity-duration curve for a 20-identical-unit system.
5.5.2 A DRR Aggregation System with 20 Identical Units
Consider a DRR aggregation system that consists of 20 identical units. The
parameters for each unit are the same as those of unit 1 in Example 3. Let
r = 150 kW, and assume that there are no constraints on ui; then, an SHS
model withM = 21 results. The lower bound of P (r, τ) can be obtained using
(5.9) or (5.11). The two lower bounds are depicted in Fig. 5.11. Another way
to estimate the value of P (r, τ) is to run Monte Carlo simulation 10,000 times
and calculate the percentage of the resulting sample paths, for which the state
variable is still within the limit at time τ . The result is depicted in Fig. 5.11
as well. By varying the value of r, we can obtain the probability-power-
duration contour as shown in Fig. 5.12 (obtained by our proposed estimation
method) and in Fig. 5.13 (obtained through Monte Carlo simulations). Then,
by setting the probability to be a desired confidence level (for example, 95%),
we can obtain a capacity-duration curve, as shown in Fig. 5.14. Note that the
capacity-duration curve obtained using the lower bounds of P (r, τ) matches
with the one obtained through Monte Carlo simulations. We also calculated
the capacity-duration curve assuming there is no failure at all, which can be
described as r = NaC
1−e−aτ . The difference between this curve and the curve
with reliability considered represents the impact on the system capacity of
uncertain events.
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Figure 5.15: Capacity-duration curve for a 1000-unit system.
5.5.3 A DRR Aggregation System with 1000 Identical Units
Consider a system with 1000 identical units, the parameters of which are
the same as those of unit 1 in Example 3. After aggregating the modes
with same number of functional units as one, we can develop an SHS model
with 1001 states to describe this system. Alternatively, since the probability
that a large number of units may fail is very small (which can be quanti-
fied by the occupational probability), we can truncate the 1001-mode model
and obtain a 100-mode model by neglecting the modes for which more than
100 units fail. Then, following the same procedure described above, we can
obtain the capacity-duration curve with 95% confidence, which is shown in
Fig. 5.15. Note that when numerically solving the ODEs given in (5.8), an
implicit integration method should be used instead of an explicit method
to avoid numerical stability issues. The curves obtained by our proposed
method closely match those obtained by Monte Carlo simulations. The com-
putational time of the Monte Carlo simulation method is 4.13 hours, while
our method takes 11.4 seconds.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we presented a method to evaluate the capacity-duration
characteristics of DRR aggregation systems consisting of battery-like DRRs
with a desired confidence level. We also showed that this method is appli-
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cable to DRR aggregation systems that include other types of DRRs and
control algorithms. The computation time of the proposed method is re-
duced significantly as compared to Monte Carlo simulations, which allows
aggregators to perform analyses under different scenarios in a timely man-
ner. The effectiveness and scalability of the proposed method was illustrated
through several case studies in which we show how to address the explosion
in the dimension of the SHS model state space.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE
WORK
In this chapter, we first present a summary of the thesis, highlighting its con-
tributions to evaluating the impact of uncertainty on power systems. Next,
we present several avenues for future work.
6.1 Thesis Summary and Contributions
In this thesis, we focused on evaluating the impact of cyber-physical uncer-
tainty on power system performance. In Chapter 1, we first identified the
sources of uncertainty arising from both physical and cyber components in
power systems, and recognized the gaps that have not been studied. We
mainly focused on (i) the impact of measurement uncertainty on power sys-
tem dynamic performance (in the transmission level) and (ii) the impact
of uncertain phenomena on systems coordination DRRs (in the distribution
level).
Chapter 2 is the first of three chapters involving bulk power transmission
systems. In this chapter, we focused on evaluating the impact of measure-
ment errors on the dynamic performance of power systems with AGC. A
framework to model both deterministic and random measurement errors, as
well as the corresponding analysis method were developed. Along the process,
a reduced-order model of the power system with AGC obtained by decou-
pling the fast and slow time scales of system dynamics was also presented
and discussed. Chapter 3 investigated the impact of measurement delays on
the system performance. First, we developed a more accurate model to de-
scribe the system dynamics, considering the discrete nature of the sampling
process in AGC. A hybrid system model containing a continuous-time sub-
system describing the physical layer dynamics, and a discrete-time subsystem
describing the dynamics of the AGC algorithms was presented. With this
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framework, we can determine whether the measurement delays remain within
acceptable ranges to maintain system stability. For the studies in Chapters
2 and 3, a power system simulation package is required to simulate and ver-
ify the impact of various uncertain factors on power system performance;
thus, Chapter 4 developed such a power system simulation package based
on an existing MATLAB-based simulation toolbox. Our package enables the
possibility of including AGC in simulations, and augments the linearization
capability to include the effect of AGC when enabled in simulations. Fur-
thermore, a GUI was developed so that users can easily impose measurement
noise/errors and delays to signals used by the AGC system, and simulate the
impact on power system dynamics.
Chapter 5 focused on the impact of uncertain phenomena on the reliability
of DRR aggregation systems at the distribution level. A DRR aggregation
system model, including the dynamics of individual DRR units, and a control
scheme was first presented. Then, we have developed a SHS model that can
capture both DRR continuous dynamics and discrete events that arise from
random failures and repairs. Then, a reliability measure, the probability
that the DRR aggregation system can successfully provide a certain amount
of power for a period of time, was proposed and evaluated. Subsequently,
the system capacity-duration curves with any desired confidence level can be
easily obtained.
Note that, in this thesis, we focus on the impact of several specific types
of uncertain factors on two specific applications at the transmission and dis-
tribution levels. However, the modeling framework and analysis methods
proposed in this thesis, such as the random measurement modeling, hybrid
power system model with AGC, and SHS modeling, are also applicable to
evaluating the impact of other uncertain factors on different power systems.
Especially, the SHS formalism can provide a very powerful framework to cap-
ture continuous dynamics, continuous random factors, and discrete random
events. For instance, the model developed in Chapter 2 can be viewed as a
special case of the SHS model with one mode. We will illustrate this point
further in Section 6.2.
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6.2 Future Work
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the measurement data may be delayed, manip-
ulated, or even lost. In Chapters 2 and 3, we investigated the impact of
manipulated and delayed measurements. Measurement loss is also possible,
due to lossy communication networks or malicious cyber attack, and can be
random. We could apply the SHS model to capture random discrete data
loss events, and evaluate the impact on power system dynamic performance.
Along the same lines as above, although we focus on the uncertainty of
measurements that are used in power system operation and control, command
signals may also be delayed, manipulated, or even lost. We could conduct
similar studies to evaluate the impact of command signal uncertainty on
power system performance.
As listed in Chapter 1, besides the uncertainty introduced from cyber and
physical components, the uncertainty in economics and policies, such as the
fuel and energy prices, and market rule reformation, may also affect the power
system market, operations, and performance in a relatively long time scale;
studies on the impact of such uncertainty could be further conducted.
In this thesis, parameters in the models are assumed to be known. How-
ever, as discussed in Chapter 1, some parameters, such as the parameters in
load models, are difficult to be accurately obtained, which introduces epis-
temic uncertainty and eventually affect the power system operations, control,
and performance. Some parameters, such as the transition rates in the SHS
model in Chapter 5, may not have been investigated yet. Future work could
be to investigate how to estimate these parameters using the data obtained
from smart meters through statistical learning methods (e.g., the expectation
maximization algorithm in the hidden Markov model).
This thesis mainly focuses on evaluating the impact of various types of
uncertainty. And we have identified some critical uncertain factors that may
degrade the system performance. This is the first step to address the un-
certainty arising from emerging technologies in power systems. The next
step could be how to mitigate such impact through advanced control and
protection mechanisms.
Finally, moving forward, we envision power systems operated under a high
degree of uncertainty, and a tight coupling between cyber and physical com-
ponents in both transmission and distribution systems. The impact of intro-
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duced uncertainty should be fully understood before emerging technologies
are utilized. This thesis provides some efforts toward this direction; much
more work still needs to be conducted to ensure the reliability and security
of power systems.
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